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IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY: 
RECONCIliNG MAJORITY RULE, 
MINORITY RIGHTS, AND GROUP 
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
ROBIN M. FIELDS* 
"We are born into certain groups, others we choose, and still others 
choose us. Life not subject to the call of groupness is as difficult 
for us to imagine as life not subject to the individuating call of 
personhood or to the sociating call of sociality. ''I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The post-Cold War era allows us to reflect on the recent changes 
that have occurred internationally due to a multiplicity of technologi-
cal advances. As governmental systems in the former Soviet Union were 
dismantled, legal scholars, economists, as well as social and political 
theorists began to analyze which governmental systems allow for a 
more substantial recognition and respect for the rights of citizens. 
Currently, we bear witness to some of the most complex and challeng-
ing issues as majority and minority alliances shift, re-align themselves, 
and attempt to restructure the legal relationships which govern their 
lives.2 Although historically the reallocation of power between majority 
and minority groups is clearly far from a new phenomenon,3 recent 
events illustrate the universality of these issues. Particularly, current 
events show the importance of developing cogent strategies to prevent 
tensions from exacerbating into violent conflict.4 Implicit in the ac-
knowledgement of the need to address the concerns of groups of 
people who share racial, religious, and cultural commonalities that 
* Executive Editor-Book Reviews, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
1 Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1001, 
1070 (1983). 
2 See Sugata Bose, Safeguard for Minorities Ver:sus Sovereignty of Nations, 19 FLETCHER F. WORLD 
AFF., Winter/Spring 1995, at 26. 
3 See Hurst Hannum, Introduction, 19 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1995, at l. 
4 See id. at 2. 
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differ from the majority of the population, is the understanding that, 
for whatever reason, numerous minority groups feel that the political, 
legal, and social institutions as they currently exist may not fully respect 
or protect minority group norms, and their minority status prevents 
them from fully availing themselves of the political process. 
The recent political changes in South Mrica which have resulted 
in a substantial modification of the distribution of political power 
between members of majority and minority groups, and the continued 
debate over minority group rights in the United States, provide for an 
interesting comparative analysis of majority rule, minority group rights, 
and the extent to which racial group discrimination highlights the 
tension between individual rights and majoritarian democracy, as well 
as the tension between community-oriented rights and race-based group 
privilege. However, this analysis must allow for notable variables. Al-
though the wide economic and social disparities between Whites and 
Blacks in both countries are somewhat analogous, the power dynamics 
are incredibly significant. In South Mrica, there are numerical vari-
ations which alter traditional views on the distribution of power be-
tween majority and minority groups. These variations clearly modify 
the nature of the terms "group rights" and "minority rights."5 
This Note will explore the political and philosophical theories 
which embody democracy and majority rule as well as their apparent 
complication due to race-based group discrimination and group-ori-
ented policies. Part II will briefly highlight the current issues that 
confront both nations regarding individual and group rights. Part III 
will focus on group formation and identification. Utilizing a social and 
historical perspective, it will briefly outline some of the factors that 
help shape group identity and explore to what extent groups are 
recognized as having distinct rights under international law. In addi-
5 In 1993, Whites in South Mrica, including Mrikaners and other White ethnic groups, were 
in the minority and formed approximately 13% of the population (Coloureds are 8.5%, Indians 
are 2.5%, and Blacks are 76% of the South Mrican population respectively). SOUTH AFRICAN 
INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SURVEY 1994/1995 (1995), at 1. In the United 
States, Blacks-who are one of several designated minority groups-form approximately 11 % of 
the population. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, COBBLESTONE LEADERSHIP: MAJORITY RULE, MINOR-
ITY POWER 73 (1990). An important distinction between the minorities in South Mrica and those 
in the United States is: defensive versus affirmative and negative versus positive aspects of their 
minority status. ALBIE SACHS, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA 154 (1990) 
[hereinafter SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS]. The White minority in South Mrica have been afforded 
exclusive privileges while affirmatively engaging in discriminatory actions. See id. Conversely, the 
Black minority in the United States, have been singled out as a subject of discriminatory actions. 
See id. 
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tion, Part III will briefly outline some of the group protectionary 
measures proposed in South Mrica, as well as key examples of racial 
group rights and methods of protection offered in the United States. 
Part IV will reconcile some of the competing theories of democ-
racy, majority rule, and minority rights with group racial discrimina-
tion. It will highlight the complexity of a m~ority-rule centered system 
where individuals are sharply categorized according to race. Focusing 
on both actual and proposed initiatives to protect minority groups, it 
argues that although whites in South Mrica are delegated to the posi-
tion of "minority," their need for constitutional protection is distin-
guishable from that of Blacks in the United States. Part V will discuss 
individualism and communitarianism, two ideological theories which 
influence democratic applications. Importantly, this Note will discuss 
how these ideologies have impacted and influenced the governmental 
systems in South Mrica and the United States. In addition, it will 
address individualism and communitarianism in the context of group 
rights, and attempt to reconcile the impact of racial group discrimina-
tion on individual and group rights. Finally, Part VI will offer sugges-
tions on how individual and group rights may be harmonized, and 
illustrate potential directions for the future of both countries. This 
Note does not attempt to serve as an exhaustive study of these issues, 
but rather seeks to analyze some of the commonalities in an effort to 
contribute to the growing amount of literature on comparative inter-
national law and minority/human rights. 
II. THE PRELIMINARIES: WHERE ARE WE? 
On April 27, 1994, the Republic of South Mrica conducted its first 
"all race" democratic election.6 This long-awaited event signified a 
6 Bronwen Manby, Sooth Africa:. Minority Conjlid and the Legacy of Minority Rule, 19 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1995, at 28. In South Africa, the concept of "universal suffrage" 
has continued to diminish in meaning for nearly 150 years. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC 
SOUTH AFRICA? 105 (1991). When the Cape Province, one offour provinces in South Mrica, first 
received representative government in 1853, the franchise was "color blind." Id. By 1910, and 
with the creation of the Union of South Mrica, Blacks had been stripped of their right to be 
elected to Parliament, but many Blacks in the Cape Province still held the franchise. Albie Sachs, 
A Bill of Rights for Sooth Africa: Areas of Agreement & Disagreement, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 
13,13 (1989) [hereinafter, Sachs, A Bill of Rights]; HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 105. From 1930-31, 
the franchise was extended to all White adults, but there were property qualifications for all other 
groups. Id. In 1936, Blacks in the Cape Province were removed from the common roll and placed 
on a separate roll whereby they could elect three white representatives. Id. Under the authority 
of the Bantu Self-Government Act (1959), all but white voters were removed from the electorate. 
Id. at 11. The amended portion of the Electoral Act of 1979 extended the right to vote in 
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dramatic step away from the overriding presence and impact of the 
institutionalized legal, social, economic, and political system of racism, 
known as apartheid.7 In addition, this election signified the beginning 
of a nation's arduous journey toward democratization.8 Numerous 
political leaders have successfully negotiated critical aspects of an in-
terim Constitution and Government, in order to witness the dramatic 
rebirth of a "new South Mrica. ''9 
This journey, while marked by what could be easily characterized 
as extreme problems of "difference, division, and antipathy,"IO has 
tremendous significance throughout the international community.H 
parliamentary elections to Coloureds and Indians. South African Electoral Act of 45 § 3(1) 
(1989). In 1983, two new chambers of parliament were created, one for Indians and one for 
Coloureds-both with limited powers. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 (1983). 
Blacks were not allowed to vote or become a part of the central organs of legislation and 
administration. Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional options fur Post-Apartheid South Africa, 40 
EMORY LJ. 745, 747 n.12 (1991). 
7 See van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 747-53. In 1991, the tricameral Parliament-separated 
for Whites, Coloureds, and Indians-passed legislation which abolished the Population Registra-
tion Act, which legally classified every South Mrican by race. TIMOTHY SISK, DEMOCRATIZATION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ELUSIVE SOCIAL CONTRACT 56 (1995). 
8 See HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at xi-xiii. It should be noted that prior to the election, Black 
South Africans consistently engaged in forms of organized resistance against Afrikaner rule 
through worker strikes, boycotts, arrests, protests, and armed struggles. See Charles Villa-Vicencio, 
Whither South Africa?: Constitutionalism and Law-Making, 40 EMORY LJ. 141, 142 (1991); Adrien 
Katherine Wing, Communitarianism vs. Individualism: Constitutionalism in Namibia and South 
Africa, 11 WIS. L. REv. 295, 351-52, n.279-82 (1993). In February 1990, the South African 
government lifted a ban on the African National Congress (ANC) , Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), 
and South African Communist Party (SACP). Id. This event, in addition to former President de 
Klerk's release of political prisoners-such as Nelson Mandela who served a twenty-seven year 
prison term- and the easing of some emergency restrictions; are widely heralded as dramatic 
events that signified the beginning of the transition to democracy. Lynn Berat, A New South 
Africa?: Prospects for an Africanist BiU of Rights and a TransfcrrmedJudiciary, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L 
& COMPo LJ. 467, 467 (1991); Villa-Vicencio, supra note 8, at 141; Hugh Corder, Towards a South 
African Constitution, 57 MOD. L. REv. 491, 495 (1994). 
9 Corder, supra note 8, at 500-05. 
10 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at xii. The degree of division and difference is evidenced by the 
extreme level of violence that has continued to plague this nation for many years. In the period 
from 1983-92, there were more than 118,000 murders, of which more than 15,000 arose from 
political violence. Corder, supra note 8, at 494 n.lO. Most recently, the violence has centered 
around rival ethnic groups in the townships. Manby, supra note 6, at 39-40. The level of violence 
in the year preceding the elections escalated to extreme levels. A total of 4,502 people died in 
political violence in 1993. AFRICA REVIEW 1995 ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REpORT 175 (1994) 
[hereinafter AFRICA REVIEWl. Although the first four months of 1994 resulted in a total of 1,601 
deaths, remarkably, the violent disturbances ended at the start of the elections. Id. at 171. The 
cessation of violence provides evidence of the hope and promise surrounding the implementation 
of democracy. 
11 AFRICA REVIEW, supra note 10, at 181. This historical transition is a milestone due to South 
Africa's acceptance back into the international community, after being virtually ostracized and 
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The community watches in awe with the hope that South Mrica is able 
to do what so many countries have failed to do: unite its citizens under 
a governmental system which encourages the respect of difference 
among members of a vastly heterogeneous society; and simultaneously, 
ensure that all people are treated as equals, without any discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, religion, gender or other distinction. 
This dual-goal, to a large degree, highlighted the close relation-
ship between process and substance during the transition to democ-
racy.12 Not only is South Mrica divided racially and ethnically, but it is 
also polarized within and across racial groups on the basis of ideologi-
cal differences. 13 Witnessing a full and legitimate transition to democ-
racy requires leaders to construct inclusive policies and institutions 
which reduce conflict, foster conciliation, and promote intergroup 
accommodation. 14 Although there are still tremendous hurdles to over-
come, implementing a "non-racial democracy"15 seems to be a sensible 
stigmatized by the overwhelming disapproval of the racist apartheid regime. Wing. supra note 8. 
at 351-52. The country has re-gained its position as a full member of the Organization of Mrican 
Unity (OAU). the United Nations (UN), and other international organizations. Id. 
12 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at xiv; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, International Law Implications for 
the Transition in South Africa, 86 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 290 (1992). The auspices under 
which change is initiated, specifically the ambitious changes sought here, may affect the willing-
ness of the parties to participate, which may also shape future interests, relationships, and possibly 
outcomes. HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at xiv. 
13 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at xii. The former South Mrican government divided the society 
into four primary racial groups. Id. at 23. These groups included: Mricans (Blacks), Coloureds 
(comprised of ex-slaves in the Cape, people of mixed KllOi or San and European ancestry, and 
Malays-brought by the Dutch from Indonesia), Indians (including Chinese), and Whites (con-
sisting of Mrikaners, British, Portuguese,Jewish, German, and Greek). Id. at 48, 83. The Mrican 
population may be further classified into nine linguistically-based ethnic groups: Zulu, Xhosa, 
Tswana, Pedi, Sotho, Tsonga, Swazi, Venda, and Ndebele. Id. at 49. The large number of political 
parties illustrate the wide disparity in political ideology among all racial groups. South Mrican 
political parties, ranging from liberal to conservative or nationalist ideology, include: the current 
ruling ANC, the National Party of South Mrica, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Conservative Party, 
Mrikaner Volksunie (AVU) , Democratic Party, Labour Party, Democratic Reform Party, Freedom 
Front, United Democratic Party, Solidarity, National People's Party, Merit People's Party, Peo-
ple's Party of South Mrica, Pan Mricanist Congress (PAC), South Mrican Communist Party 
(SACP), the Herstigte Nasionale Party (reconstituted as National Party), and the Mrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging. AFRICA REVIEW, supra note 10, at 175. 
14 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at xiii. 
15 The term "non-racial democracy" is a statement of purpose. It originates from the Freedom 
Charter, adopted by the Congress of the People in 1955. SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, 
at 4. For twelve months, freedom volunteers from all over South Mrica canvassed suppressed 
sections of the population in order to document grievances. van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 763 
n.73. These grievances formed the basis of the Charter, which was drafted and presented in June 
1955, in front of 2,884 delegates. Id. The Charter confirmed a wide-spread belief that apartheid 
should be dismantled and that the best way to effectuate this goal is to establish a non-racial, 
non-sexist, democratic society. SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 5. The principle of 
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means of resolving conflict initiated by the former unrestrained Par-
liament. 16 However, one critical yet unresolved issue, which warrants a 
detailed focus, is how the new democratic regime will balance its 
history, heterogeneity, and group-based stratification, with the need for 
a greater recognition of individual rights. 
Although the United States has a well-established democratic sys-
tem that strongly endorses, promotes and seeks to protect individual 
rights; there are unresolved issues regarding the distribution of politi-
cal power-particularly with regard to racial divisions. The United 
States 1994 midterm elections resulted in sweeping changes in Con-
gressional membership. 17 Although it has been estimated that sixty-two 
percent of all eligible voters did not vote, members of the Republican 
party gained a majority in both the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. ls More important than Congressional partisan affiliations, 
the auspices under which these electoral changes occurred seems to 
suggest that many citizens are frustrated by the means with which 
power is allocated. 19 However, party affiliations cannot be overlooked, 
particularly since they seem to bear a significant relationship to racial 
divisions.20 Ongoing racial divisions foster a climate in which the dia-
logue becomes one of "us" versus "them," and the primary motivation 
"nonracialism" does not establish "colorblindness" as it ultimate goal, but rather focuses on efforts 
of the state to no longer recognize or tolerate race as a criterion for exclusion. HERBERT ADAM 
& KOGILA MOODLEY, THE OPENING OF THE APARTHEID MIND: OPTIONS FOR THE NEW SOUTH 
AFRICA 24 (1993) [hereinafter, ADAM & MOODLEY, THE APARTHEID MIND]. 
16 See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 8, at 145. The former South African Parliament relied upon 
the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy as explicit authority to exploit the disenfran-
chised black majority. Id. at 147. 
17 See Thomas B. Edsall, Revolt of the Discontented, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1994 at A31. 
18 Lani Guinier, Don't Scapegoat the Gerrymander, N.V. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, (Magazine), at 36 
[hereinafter Guinier, Gerrymander]. This event is considered significant since Democrats main-
tained a majority in Congress for decades. Richard 1.. Berke, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 9, 1994, A6. Some 
suggest that the Democrats could have lost for a number of other possible reasons, some of which 
include: one, white voters fled the party, two, the traditional base of Democratic supporters-mi-
norities, labor and city dwellers-were given little incentives to vote, while marginal Democratic 
voters were courted via large television promotions, and three, negative campaigns and scare 
tactics-initiated by both parties-were moderately successful. Guinier, Gerrymander, supra note 
18, at 36;John Fund, Republicans Sweep to Power in Congress, Crippling Clinton and the Democrats, 
SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Nov. 13, 1994, at Gl. 
19 Linda Maguire, An Interview With Lani Guinier, 19 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. Winter/Spring 
1995, at 107. 
20 It has been estimated that party lines have been polarized along racial lines for the past 
twenty five years, with non-whites tending to belong to the Democratic party. Bruce E. Cain, Voting 
Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY 
VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 271 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson 
eds., 1992) [hereinafter Cain, Voting Rights]. However, it should be noted that this division isn't 
1996] IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY 71 
for voting seems to be a way to prevent the ubiquitous "Other" from 
winning.21 
The accompanying electoral politics, which have been subtitled by 
one scholar as "the politics of exclusion,"22 seemed to foster a climate 
nurtured by blame, anger, and fear across clearly delineated racial 
lines.23 The subtext that accompanied much of the 1994 electoral 
dialogue signified the degree to which issues of race continue to 
polarize and divide the nation.24 As several scholars have noted, the 
1994 political campaigns frequently incorporated racial code words 
-minority, affirmative action, inner-city, crime rate, criminal, welfare 
mother, social program participant, and special interests- to manipu-
late Whites' fears of Blacks.25 In addition, code words for Whites -Re-
publican, conservative, and suburban- further highlight the chasm 
between the races.26 
Despite formal declarations that the United States is committed 
to the notion of "colorblindness,"27 or equality for all, there appears to 
be wide-spread disagreement as to what constitutes "equal citizen-
solely attributed to race. but may also reflect ideological and economic (class) differences. Id. at 
271-72. 
21 See Lani Guinier, Democracy's Conversation, THE NATION, January 23, 1995, at 85 [herein-
after Guinier, Conversation]. A significant number of White men seem to resent rights assertions 
by women and Blacks and characterize such demands as "beyond the level playing field [which 
result in] a system of exclusionary favoritism." Edsall, supra note 17, at A31. If such concerns are 
motivated by a fear of declining wages and status, then clearly there are vast gulfs between citizens 
which become magnified through blame and fear. See id. 
22 This term refers to the technique whereby candidates win by mobilizing the discontent of 
some voters and demobilizing others who do not have a scapegoat at which to direct their anger. 
Guinier, Conversation, supra note 21, at 85. 
23 See id. 
24 Id.; Charles Lawrence, Forward Ace, Multiculturalism and the jurisprudence of Transforma-
tion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 837-38 (1995). 
25Id. 
26 Guinier, Conversation, supra note 21, at 85. One author has suggested that the United 
States is not a "deeply divided" society in comparison to nations such as Nigeria, Sri Lanka, 
Ethiopia, or the former Czechoslovakia since group affiliations along racial lines have not risen 
to a level of "political salience". SISK, supra note 7, at 31, 21. However, given the presence of 
voting rights legislation, and the on-going litigation which seeks to resolve the issue of minority 
voting rights and re-districting, it seems valid to assert that racial group affiliations "remain at the 
forefront of electoral politics." BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE 
QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 1 (1992) [hereinafter GROFMAN, MINORITY REPRESENTATION]. 
27 It is believed that this concept has its origins in Justice Harlan's pronouncement in Plessy 
v. Ferguson: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens." 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,]., dissenting). Several scholars have noted that the 
concept of equal citizenship, formulated by a "colorblind" approach, is designed to protect 
individuality. See Lawrence, supra note 24, at 823-24; Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (suggesting that the anti-discrimination 
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ship."28 This disagreement may be magnified by what many have as-
tutely characterized as a tension between liberalism and democracy.29 
Under democratic liberalism, the individual is the prominent entity 
whereby rights are respected; however many suggest that the ongoing 
presence of racial group discrimination strongly negates the value of 
individual rights especially when minority interests remain devalued in 
a majority-rule centered democratic regime.30 Therefore, an unresolved 
issue is how the United States will reconcile its racially-divided history and 
existing group divisions with the ongoing debate regarding group rights. 
III. GROUP FORMATION, IDENTIFICATION, AND RIGHTS 
Before analyzing the conflict between individual rights and group 
rights within the democratic regimes of South Mrica and the United 
States, it is necessary to briefly consider some of the competing theo-
ries on group rights. These theories, particularly their implications 
with regard to disempowered racial groups, provide a basic framework 
for the analysis. Group dynamics, in both countries, have a significant 
impact on how citizens interpret the role of democracy. In addition, 
since competition among groups is often viewed as an integral part of 
the democratic process, it is imperative that the complex issues sur-
rounding racial group divisions be addressed.31 
Generally, the term "group" is a very broad concept which refers 
to "a number of persons classified together because of common char-
acteristics or interests. "32 In general, groups are largely defined, recog-
principle, as a mediating principle of the Equal Protection Clause, is individualistic and argues 
for a recognition of a "group disadvantaging" principle which focuses more on equality by 
assessing social factors). 
28ANNE PHILLIPS, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 130 (1993). 
29 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The End of Histary and the New Warld Order: The 
Triumph of Capitalism and the Competition Between Liberalism and Democracy, 25 CORNELL INT'L 
LJ. 277, 294 (1992); Derrick Bell, An Allegorical Critique of the United States Civil Rights Model, 
in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAw 11 (Bob Hepple & Erika M. Szyszczak eds., 1992). 
30 See Macey & Miller, supra note 29, at 294; Bell, supra note 29, at 11; JAY A. SIGLER, 
MINORITY RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 25 (1983). 
31 SIGLER, supra note 30, at 24-5. A stable pluralist system results from policy compromises 
among groups which will eventually "reinforce agreement, encourage moderation, and maintain 
social peace." Id. at 25. 
32NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 30 (1991). 
This term is inherently ambiguous. It should be noted that in this Note, the author focuses 
specifically on racial groups and writes from the perspective that racial affiliations transcend mere 
physical characteristics and are based on shared cultural and social norms. Clearly since racial 
groups are not monolithic (and there are notable religious, economic, and cultural variations), 
none of the references to racial groups are absolute. 
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nized, and understood by their purpose, goals, membership, and rela-
tionship to other groupS.33 The legal, political, and social significance 
of a group may be largely determined by the extent to which it is 
formed voluntarily or involuntarily.34 
In a given society, individuals are often members of a large num-
ber of distinct groupS.35 These groups may, and often do, constitute a 
"minority" in relation to other groups within the larger society. Simi-
larly, a "majority" group is often comprised of a number of individuals 
who in and of themselves are members of different "minority" groups 
with particular interests.36 Despite the apparent fluidity of this broad 
conception of "group," the classification has been used in many na-
tions as a fixed method of allocating citizenship rights.37 As such, group 
membership becomes problematic when individuals, on the basis of 
something seemingly as permanent as race,38 are excluded or denied 
certain citizenship rights. 
33 See Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities 67 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 615, 657 (1992); LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 29, 3l. 
34 SeeJohn H. Garvey, The Rights of Groups, 80 Ky. LJ. 860, 862 (1991); Lerner, Group Rights, 
supra note 32, at 29. However this distinction is not absolute or definitive, specifically when 
referring to racial groups. If one characterizes racial groups as voluntary, the nature of group 
identity would be attributed to one's self-identity and self-perception. See LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY 
OF THE MAJORITY 273 n.46 (1994) [hereinafter GUINIER, TYRANNY]. Conversely, if one charac-
terizes racial groups as involuntary, the legitimacy, accuracy, and relevance of such a classification 
could very well depend on who or what is classifYing and what the classification scheme purports 
to achieve. See HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 24; SIGLER, supra note 30, at 12. Involuntary groups 
have been characterized as those groups that we are born into, and subsequendy, may not be 
able to leave. Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups and the 
AngltrAmericanJudicial Tradition, in THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES & HUMAN RIGHTS 233, 235 
n.6 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tobory eds., (1992) [hereinafter PROTECTION OF MINORITIES]. 
Despite competing views whether such groups are indeed imputed or chosen, membership within 
racial groups may center around a shared history, culture, language, religion and/or other social 
rituals. Addis, supra note 33, at 656. 
35 Cass R. Sunstein, Voting Rights, NEW REpUBLIC, Apr. 1994, at 37. Membership often ranges 
from groups united by political affiliation, profession, hobbies, social interests, and sports to race, 
religious beliefs, language, national origin, gender, and sexual orientation. Id. However, it should 
be noted that membership in groups solely formulated around issues or interests, unlike that of 
racial groups, are less likely to define a person's social relations on numerous levels. Cain, supra 
note 20, at 270-7l. 
36 Sunstein, supra note 35, at 36. This illustration highlights the fact that most groups, by 
their nature, are contingent and their meaning may be rearranged and recast through dialogue. 
Addis, supra note 33, at 650. 
37 See Manby, supra note 6, at 5l. 
38 It has been suggested by many that race is merely a social construct, imposed out of 
necessity or purpose. See HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 47; ADAM & MOODLEY, THE APARTHEID 
MIND, supra note 15, at 2; Lawrence, supra note 24, at 835. These terms are not constant and 
often reflect a combination of culture, politics, and ideology. Id. An obvious concern arises when 
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International law has recognized that minority groups have rights 
against majority populations.39 Although until recently this area of the 
law had been largely neglected, it is widely understood that the need 
to protect religious, racial, ethnic, and other minorities is a growing 
international societal concern.40 Obviously, the implications for this 
such terms are imputed by another group and are subsequently used as a divisive tool. One 
illustrative example is the South African use of the term "Coloured." HOROWITZ, supra note 6, 
at 47. Although the South Mrican government intended for this term to signifY a distinct and 
separate race, under a social system that grants explicit privilege based on skin color, the term 
Coloured merely became a midpoint on a continuum of racial group hierarchy. See ill. at 24. 
Interestingly, in South Mrican political discourse, the term "Black" is used in reference to all 
three groups of color. ADAM & MOODLEY, THE APARTHEID MIND, supra note 15, at 2-3; 
HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 23. 
39 Minority rights are generally classified under the rubric of international human rights law. 
Historically, the recognition of minority group concerns dates back to the Seventeenth century 
and the need to protect religious minorities. FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 1 (1991). It has been 
stated that the most comprehensive attempt to protect minorities internationally is found in the 
"Minorities Treaties," adopted in 1919-1920 at the end of the First World War and monitored by 
the League of Nations. RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 
324 (3rd ed. 1995). These five treaties focused primarily on equality (of treatment, civil and 
political rights, and employment), but also on special issues such as: the acquisition of nationality, 
the freedom to practice religion, and to use one's own language. CAPOTORTI, supra note 39, at 
18--19. These rights were considered to vest only in individuals. Ill. at 19. 
Under the United Nations regime, Article 27 of the Civil and Political Covenant is the 
primary statement of minority rights that is legally binding on a majority of states. LILLICH & 
HANNUM, supra note 39, at 326. It provides: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community 
with the members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Civil and Political 
Covenant). Incidently, following 1950, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities determined that the term "racial" should be replaced with "ethnic" 
in minority rights discourse. It was believed that the term "ethnic" refers to all biological, cultural, 
and historical characteristics, while "racial" referred primarily to inherited physical characteristics, 
and "ethnic" would allow for a the broadest possible expression. CAPOTORTI, supra note 39, at 
34-35. Under Article 27, the rights guaranteed are bestowed upon individuals who belong to 
minority groups rather than the groups themselves. Ill. at 35. This stems from an historical 
protection of individual rights, a need for a coherent formulation of rights under the Civil and 
Political Covenant, the political concern that allocating rights to a group could potentially create 
tension between groups and states, and the belief that an individual's choice to preserve group 
characteristics or voluntarily assimilate into the majority may be impeded by the need for a 
minority group to preserve its viability as a group. Ill. However, it should be noted that these 
rights are to be exercised" 'in community with the other members of their group.' " Ill. at 36. 
40 See Andras B. Baka, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of 
Minorities Under International Law, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 227-28 (1993). See generally, J. W. 
Bruegel, The Protection of Minorities: A Neglected Field, in MINORITIES IN NATIONAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAws 120, 123 (Satish Chandra ed., 1985); PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
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politically sensitive area of the law make the adoption of a distinct legal 
definition of "minority group" somewhat unrealistic.4l In addition, 
since the social, economic, and political needs among minority groups 
vary considerably between nations, there are also logical differences in 
treatmen t. 42 
Despite the failure to construct a consistent definition or interna-
tional standard of protection, an overriding characteristic of minorities 
in a m;:yority society is their existence in a "disadvantageous situation. "43 
This situation is described as those circumstances where persons be-
longing to a minority group are required to exert greater efforts than 
those members of the majority to participate in everyday life.44 In the 
international community, the recognition of minority rights centers 
primarily on the principle of "non-discrimination."45 There have been 
LAw, (Catherine Brolmann et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter PEOPLES AND MINORITIES]. The issue 
of collective group rights incorporates a number of specific issues including: the right to self-de-
termination (i.e., territorial autonomy via the establishment of a separate and independent state), 
secession, and emigration. Baka, supra note 40, at 234; Addis, supra note 33, at 623, 628. 
41 See LERNER, supra note 32, at 8-11; Baka, supra note 40, at 231-32. In international law, 
legal recognition of a "group" will only arise with the presence of permanent factors that are 
beyond the control of the group members. LERNER, supra note 32, at 30-31. This caveat is 
important in order to distinguish between casual groups or associations of a limited duration and 
groups with racial, religious, and/or linguistic commonalities. See id. 
42 Baka, supra note 40, at 232. Nations often have varied and complex types of minorities 
within a given society: multiple groups with varying needs, characterized by overlap and difference 
among groups. Id. It has therefore been impossible to generally express the concept of "minority" 
in order to determine who is subject to international protection. Id. 
43Id. In addition, other factors that have been cited which could be considered defining 
characteristics of a minority group include such objective and subjective criterion as: existence 
of a distinct group, numerical proportion, non-dominance, being a nationality of the state, 
existence within the state, a sense of community, collective goals and wills, and self-identification. 
Malcolm N. Shaw, The Definition of Minorities in International Law, in PROTECTION OF MINORI-
TIES, supra note 34, at 23-30. An expressly held belief by the majority that a particular group is 
inferior to the majority group, which subsequently perpetuates low self-esteem and self-hatred by 
the subordinated group, is a critical factor to consider when determining the existence of a 
minority group. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 5. Although Blacks in South Mrica fulfilled much of 
the criterion for minority group protection, the fact that they constituted a majority within the 
population required the United Nations regime to create a special category of protection: 
self-determination for colonized peoples. Manby, supra note 6, at 31. 
44 Baka, supra note 40, at 233. These efforts run the gamut from seeking access to education 
and housing to overcoming language barriers and ensuring uninhibited religious expression. See 
id. Importantly, these additional efforts by members ofa racial group are often insufficient, which 
often suggest the need to grant certain positive rights to minority groups to ensure civic equality. 
Id. 
45 LERNER, supra note 32, at 23. The term "non-discrimination" is commonly used in " 'the 
pejorative sense of an unfair, unreasonable, unjustifiable or arbitrary distinction,' applicable to 
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a number of international treaties that address discrimination and 
other issues of concern to minorities.46 
Legal rights may be considered moral concepts that arise from a 
community's historical development.47 More importantly, the exercise 
of such rights greatly depends on the existence of a valid claim.48 
Although some could argue that rights are inherently vested within 
individuals, it may be more accurate to assert that they are ascribed to 
those bodies that a society deems worthy of exercising such rights.49 
Legal rights may be allocated along group lines.50 Rights have been 
ascribed to groups in both negative and positive form.51 The extent to 
which rights are assigned or attributed to groups as a whole, or whether 
rights may only be exercised by individuals within a group, largely 
depends on a nation's interpretation of the nature and function of 
groups in relationship to individuals, communities, and the governing 
political structure.52 
As minority groups attempt to gain social, political, or economic 
power, there have been a multitude of responses by dominant groups 
or regimes. 53 These responses range from cases of total negation to 
'any act or conduct which denies to individuals equality of treatment with other individuals 
because they belong to particular groups in society. '" Id. at 25. Although this definition highlights 
individuality, it should be noted that discrimination-particularly racial discrimination-is usually 
based on group membership and not on one's individual qualities or flaws. Id. at 27. 
46 See generaUy International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation,jan. 4,1969,660 V.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Rights of the Child, V.N. GAOR, 44th 
Sess., Supp. No. 49, V.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, V.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, V.N. 
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into forC!! jun 26, 1987; Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, April 22, 1954, 189 V.N.T.S. 150; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, jan. 12, 1951,78 V.N.T.S. 277. It should be noted that these Conventions, 
in many ways, serve to protect majority groups as well. 
47DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA: IT'S HISTORY AND PROSPECT, 244 Ueffrey 
Butler et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter, Butler J. 
48 SIGLER, supra note 30, at 37. Another author suggests that a right is a legal relationship. 
john Garvey, Introduction: the Rights of Groups, 80 KY LJ. 862, 867 (1991-92). 
49 See id. 
50 SIGLER, supra note 30, at 12. 
51 Negative rights refer to the right to prevent a state from engaging in certain acts, while 
positive rights refer to the right to have a state affirmatively act, often for the advancement of 
subordinated groups. See BUTLER, supra note 47, at 245. 
52 See generaUy, Garet, supra note 1; Michael McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? 
Reflections on Liberal Individualism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 133--61 
(Abdallah Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992). 
53 By the term "dominant," this author refers to those groups that are in a position of political 
power, authority and control. See SIGLER, supra note 30, at 9-10. 
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forced assimilation and examples of pluralism.54 As such, there is con-
siderable disagreement as to whether group rights should be recognized. 55 
The growing international concern for group rights as well as the 
complexity of group formation and identification are exemplified by 
the citizens in South Mrica and the United States. Both countries have 
some interest constituencies that have been formulated and classified 
primarily by race.56 In South Mrica and the United States, there cur-
rently exists, in varying degrees, a sense of group affiliation, group 
identification, and in many respects group allegiance.57 Group iden-
tification in these two societies becomes increasingly problematic due 
to the common practice of categorizing groups according to their 
numerical proportion within the State.58 This practice implicitly as-
cribes the superior-subordinate relationship that embodies racial dis-
crimination.59 The notion of majority rule and minority rights in both 
countries, when asserted under the guise of race, has serious implica-
tions and increases the need for ongoing dialogue on the significance 
of group rights.60 
Due to the widespread impact of racism and the historical sanctity 
placed on racial distinctions, group-oriented measures geared toward 
the advancement of subordinated groups continue to be an important 
54 Addis, supra note 33, at 619. One form of response views the minority as a negation of the 
majority group and seeks to eliminate it-as with the Nazi's in Germany-or physically separate 
it-as in the United States and South Mrica. Id. Assimilation seeks to convert and conform the 
minority group into an image of the majority group. Id. at 619-20. Similarly, "paternalistic" 
pluralism often regards minority groups as the "Other"-i.e. indigenous groups such as Native 
Americans in the United States and Aborigines in Australia. Id. at 620. 
55 See Addis, supra note 33, at 632; Garet, supra note 1, at 1001-02. Interestingly, disagreement 
over the recognition of minority or group rights echoes the recent debates concerning the "right 
to development" under international law. Some critics argue that this right should not be 
recognized since it is viewed as a "collective" right rather than an "individual" right. See Jack 
Donnelly, Third Generation Rights, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES, supra note 40, at 131-37. 
56 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 278 n.77; See Manby, supra note 6, at 28-29, 51. 
57 See Manby, supra note 6, at 48; Lani Guinier, (E) racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 
108 HARV. L. REv. 109, 137 (1994). Throughout this Note, I make frequent references to racial 
groups-particularly, Black and White Americans and Black and White South Mricans. However, 
it should be noted that I do not intend to imply that these groups are monolithic or that all 
members of these identifiable groups share identical positions on critical issues. 
58 Shaw, supra note 43, at 24-25. The term "minority" literally refers to those persons who 
belong to a racial, ethnic, religious, or linguistic group or culture that differs from that of the 
greater number of persons in a given nation or society. Id. However, use of the term minority can 
be troubling, especially in light of Patricia Williams' observation that the term "implies a certain 
delegitimacy in a majoritarian system." PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: 
DIARY OF A LAw PROFESSOR 257 (1991). 
59 See HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 42. 
60 See id. at 92-94. 
78 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:65 
issue in both countries.61 In South Mrica, it has been suggested that 
there will be efforts to introduce a system of "affirmative action" to 
rectify past injustices.62 As such, the South Mrican government faces 
an additional challenge of rectifying this program, that specifically 
highlights race, with the overall goal of non-race democracy.63 Al-
though there is an assumption that the equal protection of all indi-
viduals, despite their majority or minority status, negates the need for 
group-oriented policies within a democratic government, in racially-
polarized societies this assertion seems debatable.64 
Similarly, in the United States, there have been urgent claims to 
make the political process more inclusive for historically disadvantaged 
groups.65 Specifically, the area of voting rights has received in-depth 
attention through federal legislation, case law, and numerous works by 
voting rights scholars.66 However, there is widespread disagreement 
over the continued necessity of improved civil rights for minority 
groups through group-targeted legislation, specifically race-based in-
itiatives.67 The growing resentment of group protectionary measures in 
the United States seems to highlight the dichotomy between individual 
and group rights under a system of democracy. 
61 See SIGLER, supra note 30, at 199; See e.g., SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 169-73 
(affirmative action in South Africa). 
62 SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 12-13,19-21,169-73. To a large degree, a system 
of affirmative action has been in place for quite some time in South Africa. Manby, supra note 
6, at 37. One scholar notes that the proposed South African system would be distinguishable from 
the affirmative action program initiated in the United States because the system will favor the 
majority of the population, and therefore, will not contain such a strong paternalistic element as 
that found in the United States. SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 171-72. 
63Id. at 170-73. 
64 See Lawrence, supra note 24, at 822-25; PHILLIPS, supra note 28, at 130, 132-33. 
65 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 44-45, 24-25. Historically disadvantaged groups typi-
cally refer to racial and language minorities. See Kathryn Abrams, 'Raising Politics Up:' Minmity 
Political Participation & Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.V.U. L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1988). 
66 See Voting Rights Act ofl965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (1965) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. ch. 20 §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb--l (1988)); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); 
See generally GROFMAN, MINORITY REPRESENTATION, supra note 26; Alexander Athan Vanos, 
Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1810 (1992). 
67 A recent poll revealed that 51 % of whites agree that "equal rights have been pushed too 
far." Guinier, Conversation, supra note 21, at 85. The legitimacy, interpretation, and continued 
necessity of federally-sponsored initiatives such as the Voting Rights Act remains a widely-con-
tested issue. Vanos, supra note 66, at 1835; Anthony Lewis, Is it Time to Ease Up on Voting Rights? 
L.A. DAILY j., June 15, 1993, at 6 (argues the disagreement over voting rights is actually a 
fundamental disagreement over how the federal government should act to eradicate racism). 
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IV. VARIATIONS ON A COMMON THEME: DEMOCRACY 
Democratic theories seem to be rather enigmatical, subject to wide 
variations in interpretation and application. These variations stem in 
part from the blurred distinctions between the function, responsibility, 
and limits of democracy as a governmental system and as a social 
concept.68 In actuality, there is no one theory of democratic govern-
ance, but rather wide varieties due to differing ideological perspectives 
on the structure of society and the role of its citizenry.69 
Generally, democracy as an ideal may be defined as "government 
by the people, for the people."70 Arend Lijphart, a well-respected scholar 
in the area of comparative democratic regimes, highlights two basic 
models of democracy that are fundamentally in opposition: majoritari-
anism and consensus.71 Variations on these two models have been 
adopted by the United States and South Mrica. These variations bear 
a profound relationship to the extent to which there is interaction and 
dialogue between and among societal groups. 
One model, m.yoritarianism, requires "government by a majority 
of people."72 As such, majority rule is considered a fundamental ele-
ment of rna jori tar ian politics.73 It has been suggested that majority rule 
is a useful democratic decision-making tool and alternative methods 
would violate popular sovereignty and political equality.74 Conversely, 
it has also been suggested that majority rule may not work well in 
heterogeneous societies since it may not adequately serve the best 
68 See ZIYAD MOTALA, CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA 19 
(1994). Interestingly, a number of regimes, which vary from strict totalitarian to liberal democratic 
have all utilized "democracy" as a descriptive term. Butler, supra note 47, at 8. 
69 See MOTALA, supra note 68, at 19. 
70 AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF M'\JORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERN-
MENT IN TwENTy-ONE COUNTRIES 1 (1984) [hereinafter LIJPHART, MAJORITARIAN AND CONSEN-
SUS]. Typically, the wills of "the people" are expressed by elected representatives of the people. 
Id. 
71 Id. at 2-3. 
72Id. at 21. This abstract Westminister model, which originated in Great Britain, incorporates 
a number of elements, including: concentration of executive power (e.g., one party and bare-ma-
jority cabinets), fusion of power and cabinet dominance, asymmetric bicameralism, two-party 
system, one-dimensional party system (e.g., focus on socio-economic policies), plurality system of 
elections (majority rule), unitary and centralized government, unwritten constitution and parlia-
mentary sovereignty, and exclusively representative democracy. Id. at 6-9. Clearly, this model has 
a number of contemporary variations and deviations. 
73Id. at 4. However, democracy and majority rule are not synonymous terms. GUINIER, 
TYRANNY, supra note 34 at 78; HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 91. 
74 ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 112 (1984). 
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interests of minorities.75 Both of these claims highlight a number of 
assumptions as to the equality of actors within the political process.76 
One assumption centers around the means by which the process of 
majority rule ensures that a "[d]iscussion advances awareness of clash-
ing viewpoints and promotes mutual understanding. "77 This assumption 
fails to consider the extent to which ongoing racial group discrimina-
tion stifles or prevents minority groups from "shar[ing] in the discus-
sion" and becom[ing] part of the "consciousness of community."78 
Second, there is an assumption that minority and majority groups are 
fungible and that voting outcomes merely depend on how preferences 
are distributed rather than the extent to which voters hold certain 
preferences.79 
There are two kinds of majority rule: ascriptive and non-ascrip-
tive.80 Ascriptive majority rule often occurs in racially polarized socie-
ties where elections lock out minorities from the possibility of gain-
ing significant political power.81 With non-ascriptive majority rule, the 
outcome isn't pre-determined numerically, but marginal voters may 
choose among competing parties.82 The process whereby marginal 
voters choose candidates has led to the assertion that majoritarian 
democracies produce ''winner-take-all'' and "zero-sum" politics.83 This 
75 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 91-92; LIJPHART, MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS, supra note 
70, at 22-23. In divided societies, such as South Mrica and the United States, under conditions 
of free elections, polarized groups are more likely to support parties that represent their group 
interests-which are often, but not always, divided along racial lines. HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 96. 
76 See SPITZ, supra note 74, at 211. 
77Id. at 151. 
78Id. 
79 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 77. Professor Guinier expands on this idea by 
asserting that this assumption relies on four additional assumptions that are inherent within the 
practice of majority rule. Id. First, the system relies on some degree of reciprocity. Id. Although 
a majority of the body elects their representative of choice, it is understood that they will respect 
and adhere to the interests of the minority since the majority of today could conceivably become 
the minority of tomorrow in a true representative democracy. See id.; SPITZ, supra note 74, at 163. 
In addition, if a majority of citizens elect their representatives of choice, these leaders, "virtually 
represent" the interests of citizens who are in the minority. See GUINIER, supra note 34, at 77. 
This concept of reciprocity seems unrealistic if a system involves permanent majority and minority 
groups that do not engage in a true, open and sincere dialogue. Second, there is an assumption 
that a system of majority rule reduces conflict, and is therefore more stable, since the minority 
will be outnumbered and accept the position of the majority. Id. Third, the system is considered 
a more efficient means of distinguishing competing views. Id. Finally, the system assumes that 
those who rule are held accountable through periodic elections. Id. 
80 See HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 97-98. 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83 GUINIER, supra note 34, at 82, 102--03. 
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belief stems from the competitive nature of the system and the risk that 
majority groups may permanently exclude minority groups.84 "Winner-
take-all" is a term that may be illustrated by a situation where a candi-
date wins forty-nine percent of the votes, but nevertheless loses an 
election where the opposing candidate wins fifty-one percent.85 This 
example highlights that some votes are "wasted" by a process where 
candidates who do not have ample numerical support have no chance 
ofwinning.86 "Zero-sum" politics refers to the outcomes and the expe-
rience from the viewpoint of the "losers."87 
Another model, consensus88 democracy, attempts to focus on con-
sensus rather than opposition-inclusion rather than exclusion.89 Li-
jphart suggests that consensus is necessary in plural societies that are 
"deeply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, 
or racial lines into virtually separate subsocieties" in order to account 
for the flexibility that may not exist within majoritarianism.90 Under 
this system, power-sharing between majority and minority groups is 
encouraged through the use of several devices which by their nature 
limit the power of the majority.91 
Despite the methodological differences, a common thread that 
unites these often conflicting democratic models generally incorpo-
rates the idea of citizens openly participating in discussions about 
government in order to hear opposing views, clarifying common aspi-
rations, and reaching some form of accommodation.92 The ultimate 
question becomes: how are minority group rights to be balanced against 
the will of the majority (or dominant group), specifically under a 
system that is tainted with group racial discrimination?93 
84 See id. at 7. 
85 [d. at 7, 77, 79. 
86 [d. at 121; Cain, Voting Rights, supra note 20, at 263. 
87 GUINIER, supra note 34, at 2. 
88 Consensus is another way to describe consociationalist democracy, which will be discussed 
infra at note 97. 
89 LIJPHART, MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS, supra note 70, at 23. 
90 [d. at 22. 
91 Some devices include: executive power sharing (grand coalitions), separation of powers 
(formal and informal), balanced bicameralism and minority representation, multi-party system, 
multidimensional party system, proportional representation, territorial/non-territorial federalism 
and decentralization, written constitutions, and minority veto. [d. at 23-30. 
92 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 6; SPITZ, supra note 774, at 150. This dialogue 
legitimizes the entire process and ensures that minorities are viewed, and therefore treated, as 
"equals" in the process-no matter what the outcome is. SPITZ, supra note 74, at 151. 
93 See Cain, supra note 20, at 262. 
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A. Application in South Africa 
In South Mrica, the definition and significance of democracy 
varies among the citizenry.94 As such, the proposed transition to a 
democratic government has been met with similar reactions, albeit for 
significantly different reasons. Blacks have viewed the concept of de-
mocracy with suspicion due to the historical manipulation of legal 
norms by former governments.95 Similarly, Whites have viewed the 
transition to democracy with trepidation due to the assumption that 
democratization would be predicated on the implementation of ma-
jority rule.96 
Before change was initiated, it was critical that all South Mricans 
understand that the concept of majority rule, under a system of de-
mocracy, should be distinguished from the idea of strict governance 
according to race.97 The notion of "Black rule," not only discourages 
Whites from participating in the democratic process but also perpetu-
ates the myriad of problems that the country is currently fighting to 
resolve.98 Since South Mrica aspires to become a non-racial democracy, 
it is critical that race no longer serve as the sharp dividing line that 
dictates and governs political, social, economic and legal relationships. 
The 1994 election resulted in a power-sharing government led by 
the newly-elected President, Nelson Mandela.99 The current govern-
94 See HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 1. 
95 See id. at 22. However, this suspicion may have been balanced with the possibility of 
implementing a majoritarian system, in which Black South Mricans would potentially have an 
opportunity to have their interests respected. 
96 For many White Mrikaners, the dissolution of "white minority rule" with "black subordi-
nation" signified the implementation of "black majority rule" with "white subordination." 
HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 92-93. However, the underlying implication of such a belief merely 
suggests a formal transfer of power without any consideration of the theoretical underpinnings 
which embody democracy. See id. at 104. Interestingly, White South Mricans were joined by a 
great number of Western Europeans and North Americans, who believe that the concept of 
majority rule in South Mrica implies the natural meaning of the words. Yet, it is unlikely that 
these individuals would support such an implication in the United States. See id. at 93. Obviously, 
characterizing majority rule in the United States as one of "white rule" carries a connotation of 
exclusion and discrimination. ld. at 94. 
97 See id. 
98 The Mrican National Congress was conscious of the fears of White South Africans and did 
not frame a potential majority rule-based system as one of "Black rule." ld. at 95. 
99 AFRICA REVIEW, supra note 10, at 171. The interim government will consist ofa 400-mem-
ber National Assembly, and a 90-member Senate, both of which will sit for five years. ld. at 175. 
For the first five years, a transitional government of national unity (TGNU) has been established 
to consist of representatives of all parties which received over five percent (20 seats) of the 
national vote. ld. Local government is largely considered non-racial, but during the transition 
1996] IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY 83 
ment unites a range of political constituencies, including the Mrican 
National Congress (ANC), the National Party (the ruling party until 
the 1994 election), and the Inkatha Freedom Party.lOO This power-shar-
ing arrangement allows for minority representation in the Cabinet and 
Legislature. lOI The national governmental structure has been labeled 
a "quasi-consociational" government in that it incorporates a division 
of power between the federal government and local provinces as well 
as increased minority power on the locailevel. 102 The process by which 
subgroup leaders were elected to the TGNU reveals an attempt to 
create the grand, elite coalition required under consociationalism. 103 
In addition, proportional representation will be implemented through-
out the election process. I04 
Since this democratic system has only been in place for one year, 
it is difficult to assess its worth or predict future outcomes. Neverthe-
less, it is worth noting that the presence of all interested individuals 
period, voting will ensure that White voters elect 30% of the councilors, Blacks elect another 
30%, and 40% will be elected on a non-race basis. Id. 
100 Id. The ANC won 62.6% of the national vote, which entitled it to 252 of the 400 available 
seats in the National Assembly. Id. Although the ANC did not receive the requisite number of 
votes which would allow the party to independently structure the draft Constitution, it did receive 
enough votes to allow Nelson Mandela to appoint key cabinet positions. Id. at 173. Some 
individuals were pleased that the ANC was unable to unilaterally draft the Constitution since the 
power-sharing arrangement would prevent leaders from enacting radical changes that may be 
considered to "revolutionary." It is believed that Nelson Mandela shares this view. Id. The National 
Party, second in terms of the national vote, received 20.39% of the votes and 82 parliamentary 
seats and gained the m,yority of the White vote, a substantial portion of the Coloured and Indian 
vote, and a small portion of the Black conservative vote. Id. 
101 Stephen Ellman, The New South African Constitution and Ethnic Division, 26 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REv. 5, 14 (1994); See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. Previously, South Mrica 
had a Westminister type "first-past-the-post" electoral system. SISK, supra note 7, at 151 n.62. 
102AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 4-5 (1977) [hereinafter LIJPHART, 
PLURAL SOCIETIES]. It has been suggested that consociationalism may serve as a more beneficial 
form of government for divided societies as it attempts to recognize and address conflicting group 
interests. Id. at 1. Born in the 1960's and 1970's, consociationalism hails from an observation that 
a number of countries-divided along ethnic, linguistic, racial or religious lines-had stable 
systems due to the cooperation of political leaders. BURNS, supra note 5, at 85. By delegating the 
decision-making process, with regard to critical issues affecting a specific section of society, group 
leaders are able to remove controversial issues from the political arena, in order to address them 
in a more peaceful manner. Most importantly, it would help ensure collective decision-making 
by requiring the concurrence of all representative groups (but the governmental process is slowed 
and may increase bureaucracy and inefficiency). Although it has been argued that consociation-
alism has worked well at some point in time in diversely-populated countries such as Malaysia, 
Canada, Cyprus, Austria, and the Netherlands; critics often cite one notable less successful 
example-Northern Ireland. BURNS, supra note 5, at 85-86. 
103Ellman, supra note 101, at 13-14. 
104Id. at 14. 
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and groups throughout the transitory process is sure to bear a sig-
nificant impact on its success. 
B. Application in the United States 
The United States is firmly rooted in the Western-based liberal 
democratic tradition. Although majority rule has been established as 
the means by which the majority of citizens may be able to have their 
individual interests respected, the United States has not adopted a 
strict majoritarian system. There are a number of elements within this 
system, such as the firmly entrenched mechanisms to curb the will of 
the majority and adequate checks and balances, which could arguably 
allow one to classify it as a combination of both majoritarianism and 
consensus. This United States "hybrid" electoral system has nonethe-
less been criticized as being a "winner-take-all" and "first past the post" 
system in that minority votes are wasted and it is unlikely that minority 
voters will be able to have their voting preferences actualized-particu-
larly due to ongoing racially-polarized voting practices. I05 
Recently in the United States, critics argue that race-conscious 
policies, specifically in the area of voting rights, are undemocratic.106 
This argument relies on the belief that democracy rests on two general 
tenets: popular sovereignty and relative equality.107 It has been sug-
gested that race-conscious policies undermine sovereignty and equality 
by resorting to practices that are in conflict with what many charac-
terize to be the only legitimate rights in a democracy-individual 
rights. lOB 
C. Interpretive Criticism of Democratic Formations 
Democratic interpretations in South Mrica and the United States 
are not without limitations. Consociationalism has a significant num-
ber of limitations. First, its acknowledged emphasis on groups may 
enhance and intensify divisions, which may thwart inter-group dia-
10gue.109 Second, it operates on the premise that all societal groups are 
evidenced by individually organized political parties. This presumption 
105 See GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 102--03. 
106Cain, supra note 20, at 266; GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 120. 
107 Cain, supra note 20, at 266. Popular sovereignty requires that options with the most 
support should prevail. Id. Relative equality requires that in the aggregate, individual preferences 
should be weighted equally. Id. 
108Id. at 264. 
109 PHILLIPS, supra note 28, at 154. 
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does little to empower or encourage disadvantaged groups that are 
small in number or have not organized themselves into cohesive, 
recognizable political parties. 110 In addition, many authors have criti-
cized the role of the grand coalition of group leaders, namely its elitism 
and ability to fairly represent group members.lll Finally, it has been 
suggested that this model falls short of democratic ideals by placing a 
greater emphasis on the proportional treatment of groups than on 
individual equality.1l2 
Although the consociational power-sharing South Mrican govern-
ment could increase emphasis on group affiliations, it may over time 
actually diminish group hostility and bitterness. Perhaps in other cir-
cumstances the grand coalition may stifle inter-group dialogue, but the 
unique historical factors that exist within South Mrica may actually 
have the effect of blurring some of the rigid lines between groups in 
order to reach some common understanding. Perhaps the group-ori-
ented policies could assist in the recognition of common national goals 
and aspirations. 
The majoritarian system also has its limitations. While there is 
nothing inherently suspect about the utilization of majority rule as a 
tool of governance, there appears to be a correlation between one's 
faith in democratic principles and majority rule and an identification 
with the values-or perceived values-possessed by those in the major-
ity.ll3 The suspicion toward majority rule, felt by some Whites in South 
Mrica is comparable to the views of some Blacks in the United States. 
There is an overriding concern that the interests of the majority may 
not adequately reflect the interests of the minority. 
In the United States, there is a distinct tension between m.yority 
rule and individual rights-particularly with the presence of group 
racial discrimination-that exists within liberal democratic theory.n4 
This tension is exacerbated by an electoral system that has the effect 
of shutting out minority voters, who are numerically inferior. ll5 The 
presence of group racial discrimination challenges the legitimacy of a 
system of majority rule where groups are fixed and permanent-in this 
1I0Id. at 152-53. 
III Id. at 154. Particularly, if a group has conflicting and multiple ideological interests or 
identities, there may be heightened competition among leaders. Id. 
112 LIJPHART, MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS, supra note 70, at 49. 
113 Macey and Miller, supra note 29, at 294; SIGLER, supra note 30, at 32. 
114 Macey & Miller, supra note 29, at 281. 
115 See Pamela Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights 
Act, 77 VA. LA. REv. I, 14 (1991) [hereinafter Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing]. 
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case racial groups. Although the practice of majority rule is considered 
the best tool to ensure or uphold democracy, it is important that 
people refrain from relying on the practice as if it was a fundamental 
group right-granted to those privileged enough to be in the major-
ity-rather than one of many potential tools to ensure fairness and 
equal treatment of everyone involved in the democratic process. ll6 
Overall, South Mrica has introduced a democratic system that 
mirrors its political reality. There are serious group divisions and the 
system purports to recognize the needs of all group members-which 
raises the above-mentioned concerns. Similarly, the United States' demo-
crati<; system reflects its idealism-universal recognition and respect of 
all individual citizens. However, the political reality may in fact high-
light that there is a need for additional steps to be taken in order to 
reach such an ideal. The governmental systems within South Mrica 
and the United States not only reflect societal and political concerns, 
but may also highlight philosophical views that are rooted in history 
and ideology. 
V. INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM 
Individualism and Communitarianism are two theoretical con-
structs that have greatly influenced political philosophical discourseY7 
Both ideological perspectives highlight fundamental disparities be-
tween the relationship of an individual and society, as well as how such 
relations translate into legal norms. 
Individualist theories derive from the following: (1) a belief, based 
on an Enlightenment assumption, that there is a universal, stable, and 
pre-social individual identity which is owed fundamental rights due to 
one's human status rather than social, political, or historical condi-
tions, (2) a belief that the only unit of our moral concern is and should 
be the individual, (3) a belief that it is only by treating people as 
individuals that we may show that individuals have equal moral status, 
and (4) a belief that through individualism, peace and social harmony 
will be ensured. ll8 With regard to specific individual rights, this theory 
116 See Alan Wolfe, Redesigning Democracy, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., MAR. 13, 1994. at 7. 
117 Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit, Introduction, in COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUAL-
ISM 1 (Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit ed., 1992). In 1971, after the publication of A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE by John Rowls, a leading political theorist, numerous scholars rejected the fact that 
rights were constructed in individualist terms. Id. Beginning in the 1980's, a widespread debate 
ensued between these two theories. Id. 
liS Addis, supra note 33, at 633. 
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pinpoints civil and political rights as the primary rights that should be 
respected.119 
Individualists postulate that the individual is the ultimate agent of 
action, and that groups are merely a collection of individual agents. 120 
They argue that recognizing group rights is problematic due to its 
apparent paradoxical relationship to individual and societal rightS. 121 
According to the individualist, "artificial" groups-like a state or corpo-
ration-may be granted certain group rights; however, "natural groups"-
like a racial or ethnic group-have no moral rights in need of legal 
recognition. 122 Although some proponents may concede that group 
rights could exist to remedy "structural or institutional defects," a point 
of disagreement arises when there is a discussion of the "moral rights" 
of groups.123 
With specific regard to racial groups, individualists contend that 
rights should assure that members of racial groups are not treated in 
a discriminatory manner and also that group members should be 
ensured the same rights as members of the majority group.124 They 
believe that conferring rights on groups would have a profound impact 
on social peace and political harmony since it heightens group affilia-
tion and makes politics a battle between warring factions.125 The argu-
ment concludes that the recognition of group rights could potentially 
lead to a dangerous consequence such as "apartheid."126 
119Wing, supra note 8, at 298. 
120 Addis, supra note 33, at 630-31. They argue that since only individuals may be treated 
justly or unjustly, only individuals have rights. Id. at 631. Some individualists also argue that "only 
individuals make judgements; groups do not have minds and cannot exercise will except meta-
phorically." SPITZ, supra note 74, at 46. 
121 See Addis, supra note 33, at 631-32. Their primary contention is that the recognition of 
group rights undermines individual rights. Caret, supra note 1, at 1036. 
122 See Addis, supra note 33, at 630 n.43. It is argued that moral rights are attached solely to 
individuals. Id. 
123 Structural or institutional defects are viewed as those impediments which prevent people 
from being treated as-individuals. Id. at 631. When these defects occur, it is argued that rights 
may be attributed to "natural" groups--on a temporary basis. Id. at 631. 
124 Id. at 633. 
125 Id. at 632. In addition, individualists contend that recognizing group rights would ulti-
mately harm minority group members since intolerance, prejudice, and stereotyping would 
govern the interaction between group members. Id. However, this would not necessarily be the 
result if, in a heterogeneous society, group cultural differences were equally valued and affirmed. 
Croups should be encouraged to participate in institutional dialogue and viewed as equally 
valuable to the political process. See id. at 621. 
126 Id. at 632. Some critics in South Africa and the United States argue that affirmative action 
programs are similar to apartheid in that they both rely on a system of "group privilege." Id. at 
632 n.50. However, these claims are arguably invalid in that apartheid is premised on the belief 
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Despite the emphasis placed on individual autonomy, proponents 
of individualism have recognized the interdependence of people in 
society.127 They recognize that one's social ties, obligations, and exist-
ence in a larger community often help to shape one's interests. 128 The 
question remains to what degree community impacts and influences 
individuality, and whether such an influence may be translated as the 
need to recognize group-based rights. 
Communitarianism, a popular counter-response to the individual-
ist theory, argues that focusing solely on the individual-divorced from 
their interaction with others-constructs an "autonomous individual" 
that simply does not exist in real life. 129 Communitarians argue that 
one's roles, relationships, and commitments define, inspire, and intri-
cately connect with individual action.130 In addition, communitarians 
argue for the recognition of the importance of local and national 
communities on individuals. 131 They also argue that individualism fails 
to take into consideration the importance of culture and tradition 
which are formulated through groupS.132 
Proponents of communitarianism contend that groups, while dis-
tinct from individuals and the greater society, have a legitimate value 
that should be recognized as complementary to rather than in compe-
tition with other entities.!33 These theorists also suggest that "a group 
that one racial group is superior to another and the system was designed to perpetuate gross 
disparities among groups. Id. The strategic efforts at segregating Blacks onto homelands, despite 
the policy of "separate development," was not done out of respect for group culture, but rather 
group contempt. Id. In contrast, affirmative action, in both the United States and South Africa, 
seeks to achieve social equality and active participation for members of oppressed groups. Id. 
127 SPITZ, supra note 74, at 41. 
128 See id. 
129 Addis, supra note 33, at 640-41. 
130Id. 
131 Id. at 646. However, this perspective fails to take account of the historical way in which 
notions of "community" have meant very little to those who are marginalized and excluded. Id. 
at 647-48. 
132Wing, supra note 8, at 301. Communitarians advocate for the recognition of a number of 
types of groups ranging from families, racial and religious groups, and minority groups to local 
communities, regions, and even nations. See id. at 302. 
133 See Garet, supra note 1, at 1001. These theorists argue that collective and individual rights 
are not antagonistic and that the rights can be harmonized. Id. Again, it is important to note that 
neither groups nor individual identities are stable. Both are formed by interacting with other 
individuals and groups, respectively. Addis, supra note 33, at 655. In addition, when focusing on 
group rights, this author wishes to emphasize that the present discussion refers to disadvantaged 
groups. Groups with political and economic power are in better positions to protect themselves. 
See id. at 657. Although a disadvantaged status is most frequently associated with "minority 
groups", this status does not automatically arise from a lessor numerical proportion. SIGLER, supra 
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of persons, predominately of common descent, who think of them-
selves as collectively possessing a separate identity based on race or on 
shared cultural characteristics," may constitute units of moral value and 
are therefore worthy of legal rights.134 With regard to specific forms of 
individual rights, communitarians suggest that economic, social and 
cultural rights should be respected in addition to civil and political 
rights.135 Clearly, these two theories are not rigid and, as evidenced by 
South Africa and the United States, a nation may formulate systems which 
simultaneously reflect these ideologies, or fluctuate between the two. 
A. South Africa 
African history does not reveal a strong adherence to the tradition 
of individualism, which is most commonly associated with Western 
liberal democracy.136 Most countries on the African continent, dating 
from periods following independence from colonial rule, were gov-
erned by rigid authoritarian governments which failed to give credence 
to individual rights.137 Although there are disparate views on the role 
of communitarianism in traditional African society, several authors 
have agreed that during pre-colonial rule in several countries, group 
or community-centered values and traditions bore a significant rela-
tionship to the governmental structure.138 
Interestingly, South Africa, in particular, arguably has simultane-
ously adhered to both individualist and communitarian notions by 
creating a social system whereby groups are the most respected entity 
in society and the recognition of individual rights hinged on group 
membership. Although the notion of individual rights was not a for-
eign or unrecognized concept, the innovation in South Africa stems 
from the lack of universality. 
note 30, at 8. Such rights are not interpreted to mean the right to subjugate, discriminate against, 
or dominate any other group. 
134Butler, supra note 47, at 245. 
135Wing, supra note 8, at 302. 
136Id. at 306 n.40. It has been suggested that Mrica does not have the necessary preconditions 
for the successful implementation of Western-styled liberal democracy: an open class system, a 
capitalist economy, a high literacy rate, and participation from voluntary organizations. Id. 
137Id. at 30tHJ7. 
138 See id. at 310-13; MOTALA, supra note 68, at 29-31. Traditionally, a chief or king, in 
addition to the elders of the community, served as the primary governmental leaders. MOTALA, 
supra note 68, at 29. Discussion and consultation were key features of this structure. Id. In social 
and economic terms, the notion of equality extended beyond that of individualism and was 
representative of the desire of the community. Id. at 30-1. 
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1. Apartheid: A Formal Sanction of Group Hierarchy 
The prior discussion on group formation and identification, when 
applied to South Africa, is best understood in its proper historical 
context. Many of the current issues that confront South Mrica stem 
from firmly entrenched practices of racial exclusion and group privi-
lege. These practices relied on the belief that one's physiognomy 
predetermined one's destinyJ39 In addition, skin color determined 
one's individual rights, how such rights were executed, and the extent 
to which such rights would be respected.140 
Prior to British overthrow in the early nineteenth century, descen-
dants of the first Dutch and European settlers of the Cape Colony in 
South Mrica began to form a distinctive group of people, now known 
as the Mrikaners.141 Confronted by increasingly powerful British colo-
nialism, the Mrikaners intended to create and preserve a nation that, 
in their view, was threatened with "extinction. "142 This fear prompted 
a strategic attempt at Mrikaner nationalism.143 
Following the 1948 elections, where the Mrikaner-based National 
Party took political control of the country, the formal segregation of 
people according to race, became the official state policy. 144 Acting with 
the unquestioned force and legitimacy of Parliament, the National 
Party began to introduce its system of apartheid.145 The nature of 
apartheid, which literally means "apartness," required that all races be 
economically, physically, and socially separate.146 
This system was refined, perfected, and enforced in the 1960's 
following a number of statutes enacted in the 1950's to separate the 
races spatially and socially.147 The government passed the following 
legislation to separate the races: Population Registration Act (1950) 
(assigned everyone to a racial category), Abolition of Passes and Co-
ordination of Documents Act (1952) (required Mricans to carry iden-
139MOTALA, supra note 68, at 30-1. 
140 Id. 
14IId. 
142 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 10. 
143Id. 
144 van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 745. 
145Id. at 746. 
146Wing, supra note 8, at 349. This system, in opposition to general notions of equality, was 
destructive primarily because it was implemented unequally and in a discriminatory manner 
by representatives of a small portion of the population. Van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 750; 
HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 11. 
147HoROWITZ, supra note 6, at 11; van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 745-48. 
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tification papers) ,148 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) (pro-
vided for segregation in public facilities) ,149 Native Laws Amendment 
Act (1952)150 and Native Resettlement Act (1954) (limited the rights 
of Mricans to live in urban areas),l5l Group Areas Act (1950) (segre-
gated every locality by race).152 
Ultimately, segregated housing, education, and employment sup-
ported the Mrikaner ideology of "separate development."153 This sys-
tem, prompted by nationalist aspiration and racist ideology, created a 
divided society that bore little respect for individualism or individual 
rights, by distributing rights along group lines. 1M Importantly, however, 
this system may have been communitarian in nature-since it sought 
to preserve Afrikaner "culture". However, the methodological approach 
to such preservation is questionable. Consequently, ranking by 
birth created an antagonistic social system emphasized by subordinate 
classes. 155 
2. A Bill of Rights: Towards Recognizing Individual Rights 
The historical emphasis on group rights led to considerations of 
a national Bill of Rights. The possibility of implementing a Bill of 
Rights evoked notable reactions among South Mrican citizens. A num-
ber of misconceptions prompted a serious debate which focused not 
only on how the document could best protect individual interests, but 
what types of interests would indeed be protected. The initial miscon-
ception stemmed from the historical perception of individual rights. 
In 1910, the country adopted the British system of Parliamentary 
supremacy whereby all legislation passed by a majority of Parliament 
148 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at II. 
149 van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 748 n.17. 
150 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 11. 
151Id. 
152Id. 
153 Id.; van der Vyver, supra note 6, at 746. It has been suggested that the Mrikaners relied 
upon the self-determination clauses of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to justify their 
separatist demands. Manby, supra note 6, at 31-3. Article 1 in each document states: "All peoples 
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Civil and Political 
Covenant, supra note 39; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. 
GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). However, the 
term "people" was included as a territorial concept, rather than an ethnic one. Manby, supra note 
6, at 32. 
154 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 9; See Wing, supra note 8, at 353. 
155 See Wing, supra note 8, at 353. 
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became the supreme law of the land.156 South Mrican law, which com-
bined Roman, Dutch, and English legal norms, did not allow for 
substantial protection for citizens against the potential abuse of power. 157 
As a result, Mrikaners, who were suspicious of British colonists, and 
Black South Mricans, who were devalued through this legal process, 
had reservations as to the function, necessity, and potential danger of 
implementing a Bill of Rights.158 
The Bill of Rights debate focused specifically on the definition and 
purpose of the document. While members of various groups saw the 
document as an instrument to enact specific changes, the biggest 
misconception surrounding the document was the initial view that it 
was necessary to counter majority rule. 159 Eventually, Blacks began to 
view it as the means by which majority rule could potentially be secured 
and a way to ensure political, cultural and economic rights; while 
Whites began to view it as an instrument to protect group rights.160 
As early as 1986, the ANC issued a statement supporting the 
implementation of a Bill of Rights within the new Constitution to 
protect the fundamental rights of all South Mricans. 161 In 1989, a Law 
Commission was appointed by the ruling National Party to determine 
how group rights could be included in a potential Bill of Rights.162 In 
subsequent years, this topic was met with widespread disagreement as 
to the compatibility of constitutionally-protected individual and group 
rights.163 Most leaders had agreed that the system of apartheid should 
end and that a non-racial democratic society was the ultimate goal. 164 
However, a conflict arose due to the fact that members of different 
racial and ethnic groups looked to a potential Bill of Rights as a means 
of ensuring vastly different outcomes.165 Therefore, the challenge was 
to structure a Bill of Rights that harmonized individual needs with 
potential social and group-based needs. However, there appeared to 
156 Berat, supra note 8, at 469. 
157Villa-Vicencio, supra note 8, at 143-44. 
158Id. at 141. 
159 SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 33. 
160 Specifically, Whites were fearful of property losses due to potential land redistribution 
proposals. Berat, supra note 8, at 469. 
161 Sachs, A Bill of Rights, supra note 6, at 16. 
162Id. at 16-17. However, a report later confirmed that a Bill of Rights should not be designed 
to protect groups but rather individuals. Id. at 17. 
163 Berat, supra note 8, at 477-78. The primary areas of disagreement centered around social, 
economic, and cultural rights. Sachs, A Bill of Rights, supra note 6, at 23-30. 
164 Sachs, A Bill of Rights, supra note 6, at 18. 
165Id. at 21. Specifically, Blacks were sure to seek protection from abuse and reduce the gross 
inequalities between racial groups. Conversely, Whites would seek protection against retaliation 
or revenge and prevent economic and social collapse. Id. at 21-2. 
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be an overriding assumption that securing individual rights, on a 
non-race basis, obviates the need for racial group rights.166 
Unlike the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Bill 
of Rights in the United States, the South African Bill of Rights debate 
was largely framed and defined by individuals who sought to uphold 
the status quO. 167 Specifically, White conservatives focused their atten-
tion on group rights.168 This fact had a profound impact on the sub-
stance of the debate since it aroused fears and suspicion as to what the 
document had the potential to achieve: covertly reenact a form of 
apartheid. 169 
B. United States 
The United States is firmly rooted in the Western liberal demo-
cratic tradition that places a primary emphasis on individual rights. 170 
Some common characteristics of this tradition include: popular par-
ticipation through regular elections, social equality of all citizens, gov-
ernmental concern for public welfare, and a united government. l7l 
Although the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly endorse group 
rights,172 numerous groups have received privacy, speech, association, 
and religious protection under contemporary constitutional law.173 In 
addition, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, have been 
interpreted as bestowing on members of racial groups the right to be 
free from discrimination or stigmatization from the state.174 However, 
166 Sachs, A Bill of Rights, supra note 6 at 19. 
167The early amendments to the U.S., Constitution were adopted by freedom-fighters rather 
than the ousted colonial authorities. SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 9-10. The objective 
of the amendments was to eliminate the oppression of Crown-supporters. Id. Each amendment 
focused on a specific denial of rights: freedom of speech, assembly, freedom from cruel punish-
ment, etc. Id. Most importantly, these right~ were sought in response to direct forms of domina-
tion. Id. 
168Berat, supra note 8, at 472-73. 
169 See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 8, at 147-49; See SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 6. 
It has been argued that Whites proposed a Bill of Rights to protect them from potential vindica-
tions of the Black majority. Id. at 9-10. These rights were sought in advance and in anticipation 
of oppression. Id. This posture, in effect, deprived the document of its function-to protect the 
future rights of the entire population, and ironically would have become an "instrument of 
injustice". Id. at 10. 
170 Macey & Miller, supra note 29, at 294-95. 
171 Wing, supra note 8, at 306 n.40. 
172 The Constitution makes reference to U.S. "citizens" and "persons". The First and Fourth 
Amendments ascribe rights to "the people". U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV. 
173 See e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (upholding freedom of 
association rights); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right to free exercise of 
religion); Caret, supra note 1, at 1006. 
174U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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it is not clear whether the language in the Constitution refers to "the 
people" as merely a plural reference to the individual person, or to the 
rights of groups.175 
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause restricts 
the principle of electoral equality to apply solely to individuals. 176 In 
Reynolds v. Sims,177 the Court, relying on a "one person one vote" 
standard, wrote that the Equal Protection Clause implies the "uniform 
treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmen-
tal action questioned or challenged."178 This right is "individual and 
personal in nature."179 
The area of minority voting rights provides an example of the 
complexities surrounding legislative and judicial attempts at reconcil-
ing individual and group rights with democratic theory.180 This area is 
also illustrative of the vulnerable position of minority groups within 
the United States, due to their historical inability to fully participate in 
one of the most powerful and important tools of citizenship: voting.181 
1. Race-Based Group Disenfranchisement 
In order to fully understand the nuances surrounding group rights, 
it is imperative to provide a historical framework of minority voting 
rights in the United States.182 Black Americans have struggled against 
more than a century of opposition in order to establish and exert some 
form of political power. Often viewed by white Southerners as "[un]fit 
to perform the supreme function of citizenship," Blacks were disen-
franchised under a deliberate scheme to inhibit their political activ-
ity.183 The elusive quest for equal voting rights dates back to before the 
175 Garet, supra note 1, at 1007. 
176 U.S. CONST. amend. XlV; Yanos, supra note 66, at 1816. 
177 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
178Id. at 565. 
179Id. at 561. See also Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (,The rights created by the 
first section of the 14th Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights 
established are personal rights"); United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 227 (1918) ("The right 
to vote is personal"). 
180 Specifically this area reveals a striking paradox between the degree to which a majoritarian 
system of democracy can be considered legitimate where it ignores minority rights, or conversely, 
where it may lose legitimacy by rewarding a great deal of power to the minority. Cain, supra note 
20, at 262. 
181 See Yanos, supra note 66, at 1815 n.24. 
182Although many of the issues discussed here are relevant to other American minority 
groups, this section focuses specifically on Black Americans. 
183 JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 266 
(1980) [hereinafter, FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY]. 
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Fourteenth Amendment which, in 1868, granted full citizenship to 
individuals born or naturalized in the United States.184 Due to the 
ambiguous language of this Amendment, Blacks were not protected 
from voter discrimination on racial grounds.185 During the period known 
as Reconstruction, from approximately 1861-1874, Black voter partici-
pation was increasingly high on both the state and federal levels. 186 
Blacks began to hold political offices in many Southern states187 as well 
as nationally.188 However, such positions did not normally allow for any 
substantial exercise of political influence.189 
The passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was a Congressional 
attempt to provide explicit Constitutional protection for Black suf-
frage. 190 However, this Amendment was rendered insignificant in many 
Southern states due to a period of radical departure from Reconstruc-
tion ideals. l9l By 1870, several Southern outlaw organizations and se-
184U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1. It's precursor was the Thirteenth Amendment, which, in 
1865, abolished slavery and granted some form of citizenship to Blacks. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIII, § 1. Soon after the ratification of this Amendment, a Republican-dominated Congress 
attempted to ensure that Black men were granted voting rights. Chandler Davidson, The Voting 
Rights Act: A Brief History in CONTROVERSIES, supra note 20, at 8. [hereinafter Davidson, Voting 
Rights Act]. In the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, passed despite President Johnson 's veto, Congress 
required that states, as a prerequisite to re-admittance into the Union, call conventions whereby 
Black men could serve as delegates and revise state constitutions. Id. As a result, that year, 700,000 
Blacks were on the voting rolls in the South and constituted a majority of registered voters in 
numerous Southern states. Id. 
185Davidson, Voting Rights Act, supra note 184, at 9. Interestingly, § 2 of the Amendment 
implicitly affirmed the right to deny Black suffrage, so long as states were willing to surrender 
their right to representation. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA's UNFINISHED REvo-
LUTION 255 (1988). 
186 Robert Bryson Carter, Mere Voting: Presley v. Etowah County Commission and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965,71 N.C. L. REv. 569, 570 (1993). 
187FRANKLIN, supra note 183, at 244; Carter, supra note 186, at 570. For example, during the 
first legislature after Reconstruction, there were fourteen Blacks in the Texas Republican legisla-
ture, twenty-one in North Carolina's General Assembly, and Blacks constituted large portions of 
the legislatures in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. FONER, supra note 185, at 354. Most 
significantly, in South Carolina throughout Reconstruction, Blacks dominated the legislative 
process by forming a majority in the House of Representatives and heading key committees. Id. 
In 1872, Blacks were elected as speakers and in 1873, Blacks formed the majority in the Senate. 
Id. 
188FRANKLIN, supra note 183, at 246. Significantly, between 1869 and 1901, two Blacks served 
in the Senate, and twenty Blacks served in the House of Representatives. Id. 
189Id. at 248. With the exception of the circumstances in South Carolina, most bills intro-
duced by Blacks were deemed unworthy of serious consideration, no Blacks chaired any commit-
tee, and Blacks had great difficulty gaining the respect of their colleagues, even those members 
of their own political party. Id.; FONER, supra note 185, at 354. 
190 Carter, supra note 186, at 570. The Fifteenth Amendment granted the right to vote to all 
citizens regardless of race. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
191 See Davidson, Voting Rights Act, supra note 184, at 7, 11. 
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cret societies, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the White Camelia, and the 
White Brotherhood, began to use violence and intimidation to force 
Blacks from office and run individuals out of their communities who 
refused to refrain from voting.192 
As a result of the pervasiveness of white supremacy, Enforcement 
Acts were passed in 1870 and 1871 in order to appoint election super-
visors to try voting rights cases in federal court.193 Despite these efforts, 
in 1875, two Supreme Court cases seemed to implicitly support the 
agenda of the racist white Southerners, who vehemently opposed Re-
construction. In United States v. Reese,194 the Court held that the En-
forcement Act of 1870 covered more offenses than were punishable 
under the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment and was, therefore, 
unconstitutional.195 In United States v. Cruikshank,196 the Court held that 
the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed citizens a right not to be dis-
criminated against on account of race or color, but not a right to 
vote.197 These cases starkly contradict the overall purpose of early Con-
gressional efforts to enforce widespread black suffrage. Beginning in 
the 1890's, Blacks faced a wide variety of formal barriers erected to 
perpetuate disenfranchisement. Some of the barriers faced in the South 
included: literacy tests, "understanding" tests, grandfather clauses, poll 
taxes, intimidation and violence.19B These outward barriers successfully 
prevented and discouraged active voter participation. Therefore, all of 
192FRANKLIN, supra note 183, at 254. These orchestrated acts of violence and murder, were 
geared toward individual Black leaders, the more "successful" Black population, and eventually 
even White Republican leaders. FONER, supra note 185, at 425-44. 
193 See Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (May 30, 1870) (this Act imposed 
criminal sanctions where state officials were found discriminating against voters on the basis of race). 
194 92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
1951d. at 221. Here, two defendant inspectors of a municipal election refused to receive and 
count the vote of a Black resident of Kentucky. The Court underwent a lengthy analysis of the 
statutory provision and determined that "Congress has not as yet provided by 'appropriate 
legislation' for the punishment of the offence charged" by the plaintiff. ld. 
196 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
1971d. at 555. Here, defendants were charged with multiple counts of conspiring to injure, 
oppress, threaten, and intimidate two Black citizens of Louisiana following a local election. The 
Court affirmed the circuit court judgement which overturned their conviction based on "vague 
and general counts [which]lack[ed] the certainty and precision required by the established rules 
of criminal pleading." ld. at 559. Most significantly, this case was brought in response to the Colfax 
Massacre, on Easter Sunday 1873, where two hundred and eighty Blacks were murdered by 
opponents of Reconstruction, after attempting to protect themselves through armed self-defense. 
FONER, supra note 185, at 437, 530-31;]. Morgan Kousser, Voting Rights Act & Two Reconstruc-
tions, in CONTROVERSIES, supra note 20, at 160-61 [hereinafter Kousser, Voting]. 
198 ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?, 2 (1987) [hereinafter THERNSTROM, WHO'S 
VOTES COUNT?]; Carter, supra note 186, at 571. 
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the progressive efforts previously exerted in order to achieve black 
enfranchisement were virtually eliminated.199 
Voting rights activism was modified in both method and form, in 
order to effectively overcome the specific efforts toward continued 
group disenfranchisement. The first generation of voting rights activ-
ism, during Reconstruction, centered entirely on acquiring the right 
to cast a ballot in light of the numerous exclusionary barriers.20o In the 
early 1960's, the civil rights movement began to shift its focus from 
"protest to politics," and voting rights were viewed as a necessary 
vehicle to implement a broad group political empowerment scheme.201 
2. The Voting Rights Act 
The passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965202 was a radical 
attempt by Congress to redistribute political power.203 The Act was 
passed in direct response to formal electoral discrimination, and as a 
result, suspended literacy tests, deployed federal registrars when nec-
essary, and created a system of federal administrative review over the 
registration procedures in certain designated jurisdictions. 204 
199 Davidson, Voting Rights, supra note 184, at 11. As an example, during the early years of 
Reconstruction, two-thirds of eligible southern Black males cast ballots in presidential and guber-
natorial contests. Id. at 10. In contrast, during 1890, black registrants in Mississippi dropped to 
six percent of the eligible Black population. Id. at 11. In 1906, Alabama's Black registrants equaled 
two percent. Id. 
200 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 49 n.58; THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?, supra 
note 198, at 2. 
201 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 44. 
202Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (1965) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. ch. 20 §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l (1988». The Act eliminated all voting prerequisites 
and qualifications which resulted in a denial of the right to vote on account of race or color. Id. 
203 Benny Miller, Who ShaU Rule & Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial Politics, & 
the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE LJ. 105, 106 (1992). President Johnson responded to "sustained 
national pressure" and the Act was passed and made law four months after its introduction. 
GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 44-45. 
204 Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreading: The Role of the Geographic Compactness in Racial 
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 179-82, 183-4 (1989) [hereinafter Karlan, 
Maps and Misreadings]. The Act designated "covered" jurisdictions which were defined as those 
areas with a history of abuse- as evidenced where less than 1/2 the population was registered 
to vote. § 1973(b)-(c); Karlan, Maps and Misreadings, supra note 204, at 184. Each jurisdiction 
had to submit to the Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 
any changes in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting," for preclearance. § 1973(c). The Attorney General could 
recommend that such changes be denied, if found to be discriminatory. GROFMAN, MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION, supra note 26, at 17. 
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The second generation of voting rights activists soon recognized 
that the acquisition of formal election rights failed to completely elimi-
nate existing barriers to full black political empowerment.205 Activists 
during this generation were faced with indirect barriers to equal rep-
resentation in the form of gerrymandering and vote dilution.206 Ger-
rymandering is the process of re-drawing electoral districts, based on 
race, which unfairly exclude or disadvantage groups of people.207 Al-
though this process could conceivably be designed to benefit groups, 
historically it has been used to disadvantage a competing group of 
voters.20B This process has often been used to segregate Black voters 
and guarantee a white majority in surrounding areas.209 As a result, this 
practice prevented Blacks from selecting their own representatives. 
The political interests of racial minority groups could be either exag-
gerated or diminished by variations in the drawing of representational 
district lines. Therefore, the use of political gerrymandering became 
an effective means of rendering black votes practically useless.210 
Vote dilution, achieved through bloc voting by a white racial ma-
jority, refers to the extent to which " 'the potential effectiveness of a 
group's voting strength' " is reduced" 'by limiting its ability to translate 
strength into control or influence of elected public officials.' "211 Courts 
205 Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing, supra note 115, at 6. 
206 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 49 n.58. Vote dilution is a process where members 
of a certain group systematically incorporate bloc voting as a means to ensure that the voting 
strength of another group is significantly diminished. Chandler Davidson, Minrnity Vote Dilution, 
in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION I, 4 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) [hereinafter, Davidson, Vote 
Dilution]. 
207 See Gomillion v. lightfoot, 364 U.S. 338 (1960) (gerrymander changed municipal boundary 
by creating a twenty-eight sided figure and removed all Blacks-with the exception of four-from 
the city limits); GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 65 n.182. One scholar categorizes multiple 
forms of gerrymandering that were typically used against Black voters: "cracking" (splitting 
minority voters into different districts to prevent majority presence), "stacking" (large minority 
population placed in single district with a larger White population who could outvote the minority 
group), "packing" (packing minority voters into one district to eliminate minorities from other 
districts). Jefferey G. Hamilton, Deeper Into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymander-
ing and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY LJ. 1519, 1525 n.31 (1994). 
208 Yanos, supra note 66, at 1811 n.9. This term was coined on March 26, 1812, by the Boston 
Gazette, to describe a district shaped like a salamander that Massachusetts Governor Elbridge 
Gerry created to benefit his political party. Id. 
209N. Jay Shepard, "Abridge" Too Far: Racial Gerrymandering, The Fifteenth Amendment, and 
Shaw v. Reno, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 337, 345 (1994). 
210 See id. Recently, the Supreme Court has heard cases alleging that "political gerrymander-
ing"-districts drawn to create majority-minority districts-are unconstitutional. See Hamilton, 
supra, note 207. Hamilton highlights that the Court has utilized an individual and group right 
approach to voting rights cases, and suggests that both racial and political gerrymandering are 
unconstitutional. Id. at 1560-61. 
211 GROFMAN, MINORITY REPRESENTATION, supra note 26, at 25. 
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soon began to realize that diminishing the weight or value of an 
individual's vote is as significant as disallowing an individual to freely 
exercise such a vote.212 More importantly, courts realized that, in the 
aggregate, groups of Black voters could not effectively assert their 
constitutionally-certified right to the franchise. 213 
The next phase of litigation focused on the effect of minority votes 
in comparison to votes cast by white voters.214 Vote dilution cases fre-
quently confronted the use of multi-member electoral districts and 
at-large elections.215 As a result of several ''vote dilution" cases,216 Con-
gress amended the 1965 Act and incorporated new language which 
provided the right to a more meaningful vote.217 The subsequent inter-
pretation of the amended sections of the Act led to contradictory 
statements on the Supreme Court's analysis of individual and group 
rights. 
Due to the growing need for increased minority participation in 
the nation's legislature, the amended Voting Rights Act re-interpreted 
by the Courts.218 The new standard, adopted to determine if a district-
ing plan violated the Act, focuses on "proportional representation."219 
As such, the nature of the Act has been characterized by some as one 
of "group-based rights."220 The group-oriented nature of the Act has 
resulted in disagreement as to its electoral strategy and intent.221 Critics 
212 Id.; see e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 u.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964). 
213 Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing, supra note 115, at 6. 
214 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 50. 
215 Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing, supra note 115, at 7. Incidently, tiIe solution to tiIese 
concerns centered around tiIe creation of single-member Black majority districts. These districts, 
as a remedial strategy, have been criticized as an ineffective means to ensure political equality 
and empowerment. GUiNIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 74. Professor Guinier argues that tiIis 
metiIod fails to ensure accountability. 
216 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (litigation sought to equalize tiIe power of 
different groups of voters who could otiIerwise register and vote freely); White v. Regester, 412 
U.S. 755 (1973) (defined test for racial vote dilution under a group analysis: whetiIer "[group] 
members had less opportunity tiIan did otiIer residents in the district to participate in tiIe political 
processes and to elect legislators of tiIeir choice"). 412 U.S. at 766. 
217 Section Two required tiIat Blacks be afforded equal opportunities "to participate in tiIe 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice." § 1973(b) (1982). 
21SYanos, supra note 66, at 182l. 
219Id. The idea of "proportional representation" stems from Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). There, she asserts tiIat tiIe Court makes 
''usual, roughly proportional success the sole focus of its vote dilution analysis." Id. at 57. Sub-
sequently, many autiIors have questioned whetiIer Section Two of tiIe Act requires proportional 
representation. Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, Postscript: What is the Best Route to a 
Colm-Blind Society?, in CONTROVERSIES, supra note 20, at 302-03 [hereinafter Grofman & David-
son, Colm-BlintlJ. 
220THERNSTROM, WHO'S VOTES COUNT?, supra note 198, at 227. 
221 There is little dispute tiIat tiIe Act, in effect, eliminated tiIe formal barriers which pre-
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argue that the Act constitutes "special and unwarranted protection for 
racial and language minority groups. "222 Some contend that propo-
nents of the Act have shifted their focus from securing equality and 
individual opportunity to securing equal social conditions.223 These 
criticims highlight the fundamental differences in opinion, and inher-
ent difficulty, in reaching a consensus on group-oriented policies III 
the United States. 
C. Interpretive Criticism of Individualism and Communitarianism 
The experiences in South Mrica and the United States highlight 
legitimate strengths and weaknesses of both individualism and commu-
nitarianism as theoretical constructs. In theory, individualism is ideal 
in that it ensures that individual rights are maintained and respected. 
Similarly, communitarianism brings to light critical aspects of individu-
ality that cannot be ignored- particularly group identification. How-
ever, the underlying weaknesses of both theories suggest a need for a 
greater understanding of where these points intersect and overlap. 
The individualist perspective is limited in many ways. First, it fails 
to take into consideration the nature of group racial discrimination.224 
Racial discrimination is not merely a personal injustice inflicted on the 
vented minorities from exercising their right to vote. Evelyn E. Shockley, Note, Voting Rights Act 
Section 2: Racially Polarized Voting & the Minority Communities Representatives of Choice, 89 MICH. 
L. REv. 1038, 1038 (1991). However, Professor Guinier proposes that the concept of voting, as 
shaped by the vision of early civil rights activists and supported by the legislative intent of the 
Voting Rights Act, has been altered through judicial interpretation, administrative application, 
and other forms of legal advocacy. GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34 at 49. She asserts that the 
concept of equal representation has evolved from broad empowerment schemes to a narrow 
emphasis solely on the election of Black representatives. Id. Guinier argues that this statutory 
configuration, while both vague and broad, led to a search for a justifiable formula to determine 
when the statute had been violated. Id. at 50. As a result, the courts reasoned that the eradication 
of vote dilution, which existed due to racially polarized elections, would occur when minorities 
had the ability to elect their own minority representatives. Id. This concept of electing Black rep-
resentatives, known as the "Black Electoral Success Theory," is ineffective, according to Guinier, 
because it fails to establish leadership accountability or representational effectiveness during the 
legislative and coalition-building process. Id. at 54. Conversely, Professor Abigail Thernstrom 
argues that the way in which the Voting Rights Act has been enforced has effectively resulted in 
an affirmative action-based legislation which ensures that minorities are elected to public office. 
THERNSTROM, WHO'S VOTES COUNT?, supra note 198, at 6. Thernstrom, argues that the Act's sole 
intent was to ensure that minorities could participate in the electoral process. Id. at 3-4. Thern-
strom argues that the Act, as it has been later interpreted, has become merely an example of 
affirmative action and creates group rights that do not and should not stand up to equal 
protection review. Id. at 227. These diverging views are at the heart of the debate on voting rights 
for minorities. 
222GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 120. 
223 See Cain, Voting Rights, supra note 20, at 261. 
224 Addis, supra note 33, at 653. 
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basis of individual characteristics, but rather is a social injustice that is 
inflicted on the basis of common group characteristics.225 Therefore, 
injustice that is inflicted on groups of people, could reasonably lead 
to the recognition of rights of that group.226 Second, the view that 
members of a minority group should be treated the same as members 
of a majority group implies assimilation: that members of a minority 
group should be turned into a version of members of the majority 
group.227 
The communitarian theory is also limited. It can be exclusionary 
when individuals do not conform to other people's conception of "the 
group."228 Another realistic concern of this theory is that people may 
come to understand and communicate with one another only within 
the context of one's group affiliation, which could potentially thwart 
dialogue across group lines. 
While both of these perspectives are flawed and a rigid implemen-
tation of either theory seems potentially harmful, there appears to be 
a need to synthesize them both into one cogent theory. An individual 
should not be placed in a position where they would feel forced to 
choose between their individuality and their cultural, religious, or 
racial identity-particularly when the recognition of legal rights are at 
stake.229 
225 Significantly. many racist actions are not directed at individuals, but rather at general types 
of people. Id. at 653. 
226Id. at 652. There are some rights that may only be exercised collectively-as a group. Id. 
There are some things that only a group can have the right to have, for example socialization, 
and religious, kinship, or tribal structures. Garet, supra note I, at 1038. It is critical to recognize 
the potential of group-oriented behavior. Groups can treat others justly or unjustly in the same 
manner that groups can be treated justly or unjustly. Id. at 654. As such, it is also reasonable to 
conclude that groups can, and often do, serve as agents of action and could have a moral claim 
to the recognition of certain rights. Id. 
227 This observation is derived from the assertion that in order to treat individuals equally, 
they must be compared from a certain point of view. Addis, supra note 33, at 643. The individualist 
perspective argues that the point of view is the abstract individual. However, presumably since 
this abstraction does not exist, the comparison will be made in relation to an individual in the 
dominant culture. Id. Some argue that the differences in perspective among social groups stem 
from power and social inequalities. Id. at 631 n.46. As such, these differences will be transcended 
when social conditions no longer perpetuate the differences. Id. However, this view seems to 
adopt the view that assimilation is the ultimate goal. This view fails to take into consideration the 
value attached to different groups. Fannie Lou Hamer, noted civil rights activists, advocated for 
"true democracy," rather than mere equality within the existing social order. GUINIER, TYRANNY, 
supra note 34, at 46. At a 1964 Democratic Convention, Ms. Hamer distinguished between 
equality-as in being equal with members of the dominant culture-and true democracy. Abrams, 
supra note 65, at 449 n.!. 
228Wing, supra note 8, at 303. 
229Id. at 305. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD HARMONIZING INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP 
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES 
Hopefully, the above discussion has highlighted that there is a 
potential for abuse in solely recognizing individual or group rights. In 
addition, it should have been noted that both majority and minority 
groups have the potential to be the perpetrator or recipient of discrimi-
natory actions. While there is a need to strike an intricate balance 
between individual and group rights, a much larger, yet related, ques-
tion which is fundamental in the preceding analysis is: what steps are 
being taken to eradicate group racial discrimination? 
In order to overcome social systems which rely on group privilege 
and initiate a system of equal respect, there needs to be are-evaluation 
of race and groups. Racial groups, or any group for that matter, are 
not inherently problematic. Instead, it is the perception and subsequent 
treatment of groups by dominant groups that is disconcerting. 
The question of valuation and respect is, to a large degree, integral 
to an understanding of group rights. Group discrimination is premised 
on fundamental stereotypes and negative views of group members. 
One fundamental problem is the way in which minority group cultures 
are particularized or conversely, the way that majority group cultures 
are viewed as universaP30 This view has a profound impact on the 
extent to which groups are perceived as "equal" and worthy of full 
participation of all the benefits of citizenship. If groups are to effec-
tively engage in critical yet constructive dialogue, it is imperative that 
dominant groups refrain from viewing minority groups as deviants, but 
rather learn to specifY and localize their own experiences.231 Once this 
is done, all people, regardless what their group cultural history entails, 
will be considered of equal value. 
Before individual rights can begin to be recognized, there needs 
to be an understanding of the negative effect of group race-based 
discrimination.232 This is vitally important before any transition is likely 
to emerge. In racially-divided nations, it seems unrealistic for citizens 
to view each other solely as "individuals" -divorced from a group that 
they are a part of. People are not mere individuals, instead, families, 
230 The result is that marginalized groups are viewed as outside of, and often inferior to, the 
"mainstream" culture. Addis, supra note 33, at 630. 
231Id. at 629, 650. 
232 Although it seems readily apparent the degree to which racial discrimination can 
influence group identification, it has yet to be understood the impact of racism on the concept 
of individual rights. 
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culture, history, and experiences help shape and influence perceptions 
and one's individuality. As such, an analysis of group racial discrimina-
tion sets the tone for a realistic inter-group dialogue. 
Although the United States is formally committed to ensuring that 
all citizens are equal, the extraordinary emphasis on individual rights, 
without a similar emphasis on racism as a societal concern; may need 
to be re-evaluated. It seems unrealistic and contradictory for a society 
to be committed to general ideas of social justice and colorblindness 
yet perpetuate an individualistic conception of the self.233 Rather than 
highlight individual acts of racism or ostracize individual proponents 
(and therefore force victims to internalize racist acts and look inward 
to their group for support), there needs to be a commitment by all 
citizens that white supremacy (or group privilege) can no longer exist. 
Until people are respected, both for their individuality and their group 
identity-two concepts that are inextricably bound-the rights of the 
individual, community, and society will continue to be in conflict. 
While the United States continues to struggle with the nature of 
"group rights," South Africa too must strategically balance the needs 
of all its citizens and, in effect, create a system of government that will 
eliminate past injustices and conform to notions of democracy.234 This 
goal has been centered on becoming what is translated as a "non-race" 
democracy.235 One scholar has characterized the nature of the conflict 
in South Africa as the struggle for the right to be the same and the 
right to be different. 236 The struggle, when viewed this way, provides 
support for the proposition that individual and group rights are not 
mutually exclusive concepts-but can be viewed, understood, and ex-
ercised concurrently.237 
The struggle for sameness focuses on equal citizenship rights.238 
There needs to be a value placed on citizenship in which the country 
belongs equally to all and all belong equally to the country.239 Impor-
tantly, this protection applies to individuals and groups so that neither 
233Id. at 643 n. 7 4. 
234 HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 1. 
235 SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 92. Others contend that the goal should be 
characterized as "multi-racial" democracy. HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 4, 5, 7, 156. 
236SACHS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 160. 
237 See id. at 161. 
238Id. These rights are translated as a struggle against being treated differently on account 
of race, religion, language, etc. Id. 
239Id. Specifically, these rights refer to positive rights of access to education, to travel freely, 
and to fully participate in the political and social life of the nation. Id. Negative rights include 
the right to be free from discrimination. Id. 
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shall be discriminated against nor receive the benefits of discrimina-
tion against others.24o The quest for equal citizenship rights refers to 
one's status as a citizen, voter, scholar, etc., but is distinct from one's 
identity.241 Identity refers to such concepts as one's personality, culture, 
tastes, and beliefs.242 Therefore, the struggle to be different suggests 
the ability to have one's identity respected and equally valued. Rather 
than viewing equality in a hemonic culture, as appropriating the domi-
nating culture, political equality becomes the foundation for cultural 
diversity. 243 
The political arena remains the most appropriate forum whereby 
group rights can be addressed. It has been suggested that political 
representation does not have individualistic nor communitarian goals; 
rather, it enables individuals to register preferences and settle differ-
ences.244 However, one cannot disregard the "group nature of political 
participation. "245 Democratic systems may be characterized as exclu-
sionary or inclusionary.246 These terms refer to the extent to which a 
system has certain citizenship prerequisites-such as race, class, or 
gender-or extends full citizenship rights to everyone.247 Although 
both South Mrica and the United States have moved away from exclu-
sionary governmental systems by extending full citizenship rights to 
everyone, there are particular issues that should be resolved concern-
ing the role of racial groups in society. Interestingly, democratic inter-
pretations vary considerably when the issue of race is introduced.248 
240Id. 
241 With social status, it is argued, differences on account of appearance, ethnic origin, and 
language should be considered irrelevant. Id. 
242Id. 
243Id. 
244 SPITZ, supra note 74, at 39. Although the act of voting is an individual act, it is argued 
that this act can only obtain value when it is aggregated with other voters. GUINIER, TYRANNY, 
supra note 34, at 93, 249 n.62. 
245 GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 34, at 121. 
246 Macey & Miller, supra note 29, at 290. 
247Id. 
248 The interrelationship between race and democracy evoke notable reactions by different 
people. Several authors refer to enlightenment-style Western democracy as the source of Black 
people's subordination and argue that racism and enlightenment are actually synonymous. 
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Seventh Chronicle: Race Democracy, and the State, 41 UCLA L. REv. 721, 
729-30 (1994); Martin Chanock, Race and Nation in South African Common Law, in NATIONALISM, 
RACISM AND THE RULE OF LAw 195,196 (Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1995). Professor Delgado highlights 
numerous Enlightenment writings which highlight color-imagery, symbols, myths and metaphors 
which de-value dark skin and value white skin. Id. at 730. These writings include philosophers 
such as Locke, Hobbes, Mill, and Rousseau, who wrote essays which either supported slavery, 
emphasized a "hierarchy of cultures," or argued in support of the "natural subservience of the 
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Specifically, some critics argue that the recognition of racial groups-
be it in the context of group rights, group identity, or group repre-
sentation-negatively impacts and inhibits democracy.249 The critical 
point of analysis centers on the appropriate response in a democratic 
regime where inequality too often coincides with racial division.250 
Overall, both nations have to begin to reconcile race-based dis-
tinctions when considering majority rule and minority rights. Although 
the United States has a long-established tradition of democracy, this 
tradition could benefit from a close observation of the events as they 
unfold in South Mrica. These events could assist in the interpretation 
of democracy, and more importantly, how on-going racial discrimina-
tion exacerbates group affiliation which in turn questions the legiti-
macy of majority rule and the value of individual rights. Regardless of 
the current status of both nations on these issues, a long journey lay 
ahead as citizens continue to grapple with these concepts and simulta-
neously push for true equality for all. 
darker-skinned ones to the lighter." Id. Finally, he contends that in the West, domination and 
exclusion--often on the basis of color, sex, and property-are implicit in the concept of democ-
racy. Id. at 734. In contrast, Alan Wolfe, who labeled Professor Lani Guinier's writings as "un-
democratic," seems to characterize democracy as an enumerated set of rights that are distributed 
among and between different groups of people. See Wolfe, supra note 116, at 7. With regard to 
the issue of minority rights under the Voting Rights Act, he states "[M] ore democracy for selected 
minorities inevitably means less democracy for majorities." Id. This view pits members of majority 
groups against members of minority groups in an apparent attempt to secure the largest piece 
of democracy's "pie". See id. 
249 See GUINIER, TYRANNY,supra note 34, at 120; SIGLER, supra note 30, at 176. This criticism 
relies on the belief that groups are inherently at war with other groups which interferes with the 
likelihood of compromise and coalition. SIGLER, supra note 30, at 176. 
250PHILLIPS, supra note 28, at 130. 

